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Abstract
Concussion, also known as mild traumatic brain injury (MTBI), represents a common
injury in children, young adults, and athletes in particular. High rates of malingering have
been demonstrated in individuals with MTBI when faced with monetary incentives, but
research is yet to explore the impact of other incentives on test performance. The present
study sought to examine the rate of effort test failure, symptom report, and
neuropsychological test performance in college students assigned to one of three
conditions: Fake Good, Fake Bad, and No Incentive conditions. All groups were asked to
simulate concussion and provided a description of the injury and common symptoms.
The Fake Good group was asked to pretend to be an athlete seeking to return to play
following injury. The Fake Bad group was asked to pretend to be seeking academic
accommodations after injury. The No Incentive group was provided no additional
information. A sample of 171 participants was randomly assigned to one of three groups.
Participants completed a symptom report, brief neuropsychological battery, and symptom
validity test. The results suggested that the Fake Bad and No Incentive groups showed
higher symptom report, weaker neuropsychological test performance, and higher rates of
effort test failure than the Fake Good group. Regardless of group, effort test failure
explained a significant amount of variance in neuropsychological test performance. The
implications and limitations of the current findings are discussed, in addition to future
directions for study.
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The Impact of Incentives on Neuropsychological Test Performance: An
Analog Study
Traumatic brain injury (TBI) is defined by the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC; 2010) as a form of acquired injury that results from sudden trauma that
produces damage to the brain. The American Congress of Rehabilitation Medicine (Kay,
1993) more explicitly defines concussion (or mild traumatic brain injury; MTBI) by the
presence of traumatically induced physiological disruption of brain function that can be
inferred by the presence of one or more of the following: any period of loss of
consciousness, any memory loss immediately before or after the injury, any alteration of
mental state (i.e., confusion or disorientation), and/or focal neurological deficits, which
do not result in loss of consciousness greater than thirty minutes, an initial Glasgow
Coma Scale score of <13, or posttraumatic amnesia longer than 24 hours. Concussion
typically follows a blow, or repeated blows, to the skull or action that causes quick
acceleration and deceleration of the brain; this abrupt shift in movement can result in
bruising of the brain on the bony protuberances of the skull, as well as pulling and
stretching of neurons (Moser et al., 2007), also known as diffuse axonal injury. When
neuronal fibers are stretched or damaged as a result of mild traumatic brain injury, the
consequence is a neurometabolic cascade that disrupts cell metabolism, blood flow, and
neurotransmission (Moser et al., 2007). TBI represents a group of injuries graded on a
continuum of severity, ranging from mild to severe, with the most severe injuries
carrying the potential for death or permanent disability.
The CDC (Faul, Xu, Wald, & Coronado, 2010) estimates that 1.7 million
Americans sustain a TBI each year, with approximately 1.3 million seeking emergency
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medical treatment for such injuries. The CDC (Faul et al., 2010) also reports that TBI is
most prevalent in children ages 0-4 years, adolescents ages 15-19, and adults over the age
of 65. Falls and car accidents represent the two leading causes of TBI, with falls resulting
in the greatest number of emergency room visits while motor vehicle accidents result in
the highest death rate. Current estimates suggest that concussions represent about 70-90%
of all treated traumatic brain injuries (Ponsford et al., 2001; Sterr, Herron, Hayward, &
Montaldi, 2006) ranking concussion as the most common form of acquired brain damage
(De Monte, Geffen, May, & McFarland, 2009). Motor vehicle accidents are the most
common causes of concussion in adults (Ropper & Gorson, 2007), while motor vehicle
accidents and sports participation are the most common causes in children and
adolescents (Gessel, Fields, Collins, Dick, & Comstock, 2007). Approximately 300,000
sports-related concussions occur annually in the United State alone, and account for
nearly 9% of all injuries sustained in high school athletes and nearly 6% of the injuries
sustained by college athletes (Gessel et al., 2007). Soldiers in battle represent another
group at high risk for sustaining concussion. As demonstrated by the recent conflicts in
Iraq and Afghanistan, soldiers are surviving bomb blasts at increased rates, and show
similar increases in reports of concussion (Hoge et al., 2008; Snell & Halter, 2010).
Despite our increased awareness of concussion as it relates to athletics and combat, some
authors (i.e., Lewandowski & Reiger, 2009; Moser et al., 2007) suggest that current
prevalence rate estimates of concussion may underestimate the actual rates due to
underreporting and misdiagnosis. Thus, concussion has been termed the “silent epidemic”
(Barth et al., 1989) as the injury may not result in overt symptoms and frequently goes
undiagnosed.
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Diagnosis of Concussion
Concussion presents a unique diagnostic challenge as the immediate symptoms of
injury, such as loss of consciousness or alteration of mental state, are often fleeting and
diminish by the time the individual presents for treatment. After the initial symptoms
remit, the most common complaints following concussion include headache, fatigue,
blurred vision, poor concentration, sleep disruption, and mood changes (Sterr et al.,
2006). In addition, concussion is thought to impact a variety of cognitive and executive
functions, such as processing speed, attention, working memory, and concentration
(Lezak, Howieson, & Loring, 2004). Although most people who sustain a concussion
experience a remission of symptoms within 7–10 days of injury (Yeates & Taylor, 2005)
some individuals may experience disruption of cognitive, emotional, and physical
systems for more than three months post injury (Sigurdardottir, Andelic, Roe, Jerstad, &
Schanke, 2009; Yeates et al., 1999).
Postconcussion syndrome (PCS) is a term used to describe the long-term
symptoms that can follow concussion and last from weeks to more than a year post-injury
(Iverson & Lange, 2003). It is estimated that approximately 10% of individuals continue
to report symptoms of concussion more than three months post-injury (Bigler, 2008). The
most frequent PCS symptoms include memory disruption, headache, fatigue, irritability,
anxiety, concentration difficulty, and dizziness (Binder, 1986). The literature is filled
with controversy regarding the existence, course, causes, and predictors of PCS (Iverson
& Lange, 2003). Post-concussion symptoms, like headache, fatigue, impatience, and poor
concentration have been endorsed by high rates (40-75%) of non-injured control groups
(Chan, 2001; Iverson & Lange, 2003) and by trauma patients with no concussion
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(Landre, Poppe, Davis, Schmaus, & Hobbs, 2006), suggesting that the long-term
symptoms of concussion are not specific to the injury. Research also suggests that the
longer post-concussion symptoms last, the more likely emotional and psychological
factors contribute to the condition (Landre et al., 2006). Further, as symptoms persist
over time, some argue that psychological factors, such as depression, anxiety, or the
desire to manage one’s impression, rather than injury-related factors, maintain the
symptom complaints (Mulhern & McMillan, 2006). Overall, the symptoms of concussion
are nonspecific, and may be related to a variety of non-injury factors; thus, diagnostic
evaluation based on symptom report alone could lead to an inaccurate diagnosis.
The diagnostic debate is also fueled by a poor understanding of the subtle
physiological changes that result from concussion. Imaging techniques such as MRI and
fMRI have helped to explain the relationship between brain damage and behavioral
correlates in moderate to severe brain injury, but currently fail to provide information that
is helpful in the diagnosis or management of concussion. More sensitive imaging
techniques, such as high-resolution diffusion tensor imaging (DTI), have begun to
identify white matter differences in concussed individuals when compared to healthy
controls (Little et al., 2010). While these techniques are sensitive to the subtle changes in
neural structures and pathways following concussion, they are not yet widely utilized in a
clinical setting to diagnose concussion. Further, because there is a change in symptom
presentation across time, clinicians are only beginning to explore and understand the
biological timeline of concussion and the corresponding remission of symptoms. Also,
there is fairly poor understanding of the individual differences that contribute to the
experience of short- and long-term symptoms following injury. Unfortunately, the
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diagnosis and treatment of concussion are imprecise tasks due to our relatively poor
understanding of the neurochemical, structural, and individual characteristics that impede
or expedite symptom resolution.
Tools for Diagnosing and Monitoring Concussion
Concussions often resolve quickly, may have an unpredictable course, and cause
symptoms that are not specific to the injury. In practice, clinicians are forced to rely on
symptom reports as the most frequent method of diagnosis and monitoring of the change
in one’s condition across time. These questionnaires typically list the common symptoms
of concussion and ask respondents to rate the severity of current symptoms they are
experiencing on a Likert-type scale. Some symptom reports have respondents
retroactively compare their current symptoms to their pre-injury status. An individual’s
scores can then be monitored over time to determine whether symptoms are remitting or
worsening. Among the most popular questionnaires are the Rivermead Post-Concussion
Symptoms Questionnaire (RPQ; King, Crawford, Wenden, Moss, & Wade, 1995) and the
Concussion Symptom Inventory (CSI; Randolph et al., 2009). Each of the measures is
short, with fewer than 20 questions, and requires respondents to rate their experience of
common physical, cognitive, and emotional symptoms of concussion on a Likert scale.
The appeal of self-report questionnaires is their ease of use and scoring, their short time
for completion, and their cost-effectiveness. In addition, these measures do not require
administration by a highly trained professional.
Although self-report checklists provide an easy method of collecting symptom
information and are sensitive to concussion (Eyres, Carey, Gilworth, Neumann, &
Tennant, 2005; Randolph et al., 2009), the common symptoms of concussion (i.e.,
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fatigue, headaches, poor concentration, and irritability) are not specific to concussion
alone. For example, those presenting with psychological concerns such as anxiety,
depression, or post-traumatic stress disorder often report similar complaints of headache,
fatigue, and poor concentration (Gioia, Collins, & Isquith, 2008; Landre et al., 2006). In
addition, symptom reports often require individuals to compare their current condition to
pre-injury functioning, which may be subject to memory distortion and bias
(Shuttleworth-Edwards, 2009). For example, retrospective reports may be affected by
inaccurate memories, psychological factors, and other variables, such as the “good old
days” phenomenon. This phenomenon suggests that when asked to recall behaviors or
past performances, people tend to overestimate their skills, abilities, and wellbeing
(Henry, Moffitt, Caspi, Langley, & Silva, 1994). Research suggests that individuals who
sustain concussion may report fewer pre-injury symptoms, such as headaches, fatigue,
and memory problems, than their non-injured peers (Ferguson, Mittenberg, Barone, &
Schneider, 1999). Further, individuals with concussion may expect a significant increase
in symptoms following injury, and underestimate the incidence of symptoms prior to
injury (Gunstad & Suhr, 2001).
Symptom reports alone do not provide a complete picture of concussion. Some
individuals report symptoms yet show no brain or behavioral evidence of abnormality,
whereas others report no symptoms yet demonstrate behavioral deficits upon examination
(Slobounov et al., 2010). Symptom reports do not adequately measure compromised
brain function such as slowed processing speed or memory deficits. Consequently,
neuropsychological assessment has become a recommended method of monitoring the
cognitive and behavioral disruption that can result from concussion (Mittenberg,
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Theroux-Fichera, Zielinski, & Heilbronner, 1995). A typical neuropsychological
evaluation will examine an individual’s performance across several domains of brain
functioning, including: attention, memory and learning, visuoperception, verbal
functions, academic skills, motor ability, executive functions, and emotional status
(Lezak et al., 2004). A comprehensive list of commonly used neuropsychological
measures is provided in Table 1. In addition to these tests an examiner may add
supplemental measures to further explore an area of weakness, clarify diagnosis, or test a
hypothesis regarding the nature of the deficit. These evaluations are time intensive,
lasting from a few hours to more than eight hours per evaluation, and are often
administered by a licensed psychologist with specialized training in assessment and
neuropsychology (Zillmer, Spiers, & Culbertson, 2008).
The wealth of information gathered from a comprehensive neuropsychological
assessment can be valuable in diagnosis and treatment for a wide range of brain
dysfunctions, including concussion. Both the initial and subsequent meetings of the
International Conference of Concussion in Sport (Aubry et al., 2002; McCrory et al.,
2005) have concurred that the information gathered from neuropsychological assessment
is integral in both diagnosing and managing concussion. The current guidelines suggest
that neuropsychological testing should form the foundation of a post-concussion
evaluation “and contributes significantly to both understanding of the injury and
management of the individual” (Aubry et al., 2002, p. 8). In addition to these guidelines,
the National Academy of Neuropsychology (NAN; Moser et al., 2007) specifically
suggests a testing paradigm that includes both baseline and post-injury
neuropsychological testing. While this model is typically not followed for every
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concussion, the pre- and post-injury comprehensive testing scheme works well in athletic
situations where there is a high incidence rate of concussion and need to prevent repeated
concussions (i.e., football, soccer, and hockey). NAN also supports the use of targeted
assessment to evaluate the functional domains most likely impacted by concussion
including memory, processing speed, attention, and reaction time.
Despite the recommendation that neuropsychological testing be utilized in both
the diagnosis and management of concussion, the results of such testing tend to vary by
individual and no single “concussion profile” currently exists. This makes it difficult to
compare the scores of one concussed individual with that of others (Landre et al., 2006).
In practice, the administration of a lengthy neuropsychological battery following a
concussion may be inefficient and even unwarranted immediately after injury. Some
authors (Randolph et al., 2009) suggest that neuropsychological testing should not be
conducted until all symptoms of concussion have remitted or stabilized. Because
concussions can resolve rather quickly, an early assessment would be akin to trying to
pinpoint a moving target. A comprehensive neuropsychological battery may result in
wasted time and effort, particularly if six hours of testing today would yield different
results tomorrow. In addition, many commonly used neuropsychological measures were
not designed for repeated use within a short time period, and thus would not be useful to
monitor impairment following concussion. Also, traditional neuropsychological measures
may lack the sensitivity and specificity to monitor the subtle cognitive effects of
concussion (Schatz, Pardini, Lovell, Collins, & Podell, 2006), which further limits the
benefits of this approach. Finally, a variety of salient individual factors, such as general
intelligence, reading ability, years of education, and social class have been shown to be
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associated with performance on neuropsychological measures (Greiffenstein & Baker,
2003) and may further cloud the interpretation of test results.
In light of the issues of using traditional neuropsychological measures in the
monitoring of concussion juxtaposed against the time of administration, resources
required, and psychometric issues, an alternative assessment paradigm has been
developed for both baseline testing and repeated administration following injury. Several
brief neuropsychological batteries have been developed for use in athletic settings to
monitor the cognitive effects of concussion. Although these batteries should not be
considered comprehensive, they utilize traditional neuropsychological assessments
designed to measure the cognitive processes most often disrupted by concussion:
processing and motor speed, memory, attention, and other executive functions such as
mental flexibility (Gioia, Isquith, Schneider, & Vaughan, 2009; Maroon et al., 2000).
Because sports concussions are common and potentially dangerous if repeated,
identification and monitoring of concussions is imperative to prevent secondary injury
(see Cantu, 1998 and Cantu & Gean, 2010, for a full discussion of second impact
syndrome), while balancing the strong desire of players to return to participation (Collins
et al., 1999; Grindel, Lovell, & Collins, 2001; Maroon et al., 2000).
A major consideration in the use of brief batteries comprised of common
measures to monitor the impact of concussion relates to the effect of practice. An
assessment that is sensitive to the dynamic nature of concussions may also be sensitive to
the effects of repeated administrations within a short time period, from the moment after
injury across days of recovery. To combat the effect of practice, some batteries use
alternate forms of measures or make adjustments in scoring based on multiple
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administrations, each attempting to control practice effects across repeated assessments.
Although brief neuropsychological batteries have some appeal in helping to identify and
track the cognitive deficits that result from concussion immediately after injury and
across recovery time, these batteries are not commonly used in hospital emergency
departments, medical facilities, or athletic situations because they take time, require
trained personnel, and may not reliably predict concussion status or long-term outcome
(Naunheim, Matero, & Fucetola, 2008).
Another trend in neuropsychological testing has been the development of
computerized measures that can be administered in a variety of settings in a structured
and timely manner following injury. Several batteries have been especially developed to
allow for brief, repeated assessments across an array of tasks that are sensitive to the
effects of concussion and insensitive to the effects of practice. These batteries can be
useful for pre-injury evaluation, diagnosis, and the ongoing monitoring of the resolution
of symptoms, thereby helping to determine when brain function has returned to normal.
Computer-based monitoring of concussion has become the standard for many high school
and college athletic programs (Gorny & Merten, 2005).
Among the most popular of the commercially available computerized batteries is
the Immediate Post-Concussion Assessment and Cognitive Testing (ImPACT; Lovell,
Collins, Podell, Powell, & Maroon, 2000). The ImPACT was developed for use in an
athletic environment and for use as a pre- and post-injury measure for athletes who have
sustained concussion. Thus, the ImPACT is used to both explore the specific cognitive
processes disrupted by concussion but also monitor their remission over time and
improve the reliability of return to play decisions.
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The use of the ImPACT (Lovell et al., 2000) has become increasingly popular
among high school, college, and professional sports as it is quick to administer, is
appropriate for repeated administration, and boasts practical appeal for practitioners
working with athletes as it can be administered by laptop at the time of injury. Research
by the test’s creators suggests the ImPACT is both a reliable and valid measure for the
evaluation and monitoring of the cognitive effects of concussion. The ImPACT has been
shown to demonstrate adequate reliability as Iverson, Lovell, and Collins (2003) found
rates of test-retest reliability of the ImPACT composite scores to range from .67 (Visual
Memory) to .86 (Processing Speed).
Despite the strong reliability estimates reported by the ImPACT’s creators (Lovell
et al., 2000) and collaborators (Collins et al., 1999; Iverson, Lovell, & Collins, 2003;
Lovell et al. 2003), others have found the computerized testing programs to have less
than desirable reliability and validity. For example, Broglio, Ferrara, Macciocchi,
Baumgartner, and Elliot (2007) found the test-retest reliability of the ImPACT composite
scores to be lower than optimal, ranging from .23 (Verbal Memory) to .39 (Reaction
Time). Broglio and colleagues hypothesized these differences may be due to several
factors. First, the Broglio team completed retesting at 45 and 50 days post injury, while
others tended to use shorter intervals that more closely mirrored the return to play
timeline for athletes. For example, Collins et al. (1999) completed testing at 3, 5, and 7
days post injury while others (Iverson et al., 2003) completed preseason testing, then
retesting within 72 hours of injury. Further, Broglio et al. calculated the intraclass
correlation coefficients rather than the Pearson correlation statistic to explain test-retest
reliability as Pearson’s r has been shown to overestimate correlation and is not sensitive
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to learning or practice effects. Further, Broglio et al. relied on data from healthy
individuals, while most of the research by the test’s creators has been conducted with
concussed athletes (i.e., Collins et al., 1999; Iverson et al., 2003; Lovell, Collins, Iverson,
Johnston, and Bradley, 2004).
Although reliability is an important consideration, of perhaps more importance is
the ability of a measure remission of symptoms and neurocognitive improvement as an
individual heals from concussion. The ImPACT has been found to be a useful tool in
monitoring the changes in processing speed within the week following injury (Erlanger et
al., 2003). Others (Van Kampen, Lovell, Pardini, Collins, & Fu, 2006) have found that by
comparing pre- and post-concussion ImPACT scores and symptom score totals, 93% of
individuals who had sustained a concussion were correctly classified. Others (Schatz et
al., 2006) have found that the ImPACT is sensitive (81.9%) and specific (89.4%) to the
effects of concussion and accurately differentiates between individuals with concussion
(82%) and healthy controls (89%). The ImPACT has also been shown to be sensitive to
memory (Lovell et al., 2004) and processing speed (Iverson et al., 2003) decline
following concussion. Collectively, these data support the use of the ImPACT in
identifying the immediate cognitive symptoms of concussion as well as tracking
remission over time.
Effort Testing in Neuropsychological Assessment
Regardless of the mode of testing, be it traditional paper-and-pencil or
computerized, another threat to the validity of assessment data is the relationship between
performance on the measure and the effort put forth by the examinee (Sweet et al., 2000).
While it is intuitively clear that effort can impact psychological test scores, until recently
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clinical judgment was considered sufficient in determining whether an individual
completed testing with acceptable if not optimal effort (Hunt, Ferrara, Miller, &
Macciocchi, 2007). As Bush and colleagues (Bush et al., 2005) explain, a number of
factors including malingering, factitious disorders, clinical factors, or opposition to the
assessment can all threaten the validity of assessment data. More specifically, some
(Carone, Iverson, and Bush, 2010) have argued that anger, frustration, greed, personality
characteristics, and misattribution of symptoms can influence an individual’s self-report
of symptoms. Often, incentives exist that may influence whether an individual
exaggerates symptoms. These incentives may include attempts to avoid responsibility,
specific medical attention or medication, receipt of medical benefits, and monetary
settlement. Much of the research in this area has surrounded individual’s intentional
exaggeration of their symptoms (Nelson et al., 2003; Ruff, Wylie, & Tennant, 1993) in an
attempt to identify and minimize the overprovision of medication, treatment, and
monetary compensation (Raine, 2009). Conversely, some individuals may be motivated
to minimize their symptoms (Ruff et al., 1993; Lovell et al., 2003; Bush et al., 2005),
especially when doing so results in a return to desired activities such as work or athletic
competition. More specifically, we can situations in which an athlete may under-report
symptoms so that she or he can return to play a sport as soon as possible.
An underlying contributor to test performance is the individual’s level of
motivation, which may be influenced by the presence of incentives. Motivation refers to
an individual’s goal oriented behavior, which is contributed to by internal and external
drives (Weiten, 2010). Intrinsic factors can include enjoyment of and interest in a task,
and perception of gain from the task (Eccles, 2005). Others (Vallerand, 2004) suggest

13

three main intrinsic motivations: engagement for pleasure, engagement to learn, and
engagement to promote accomplishment. Vallerand (2004) defined external motivations
as rewards that are outside of the activity itself. In the area of concussion, some research
(Orey, Cragar, & Berry, 2000) suggests that individuals can be motivated by external
monetary reward to both minimize and maximize their self-report and
neuropsychological test performance. Erdal (2009) found that individuals with external
motivation (monetary compensation) showed significantly weaker performance on
neuropsychological measures that those with internal motivations (attention seeking and
avoidance of blame). Collectively, these findings suggest that an individual with
concussion may have internal and external factors that influence their performance in
testing situations.
Despite the clinical interest in identifying individuals either minimizing or
maximizing their symptom reports and test performance, it has proven difficult to
estimate base rates of malingering, symptom exaggeration, and symptom repression in
part because those attempting to do so either do not admit it or are not caught in the act
(Mittenberg, Patton, Canyock, & Condit, 2002; Slick, Tan, Strauss, & Hultsch, 2004). As
defined by the American Psychiatric Association (DSM-IV-TR, 2000) malingering is the
intentional creation of symptoms or deficits to achieve a goal (i.e., “faking bad”).
Malingering may include the creation of symptoms or deficits, the exaggeration of
current symptoms or deficits, and even the staging of an accident or injury. A necessary
component of malingering includes some gain from exaggerating impairment; these
incentives can range from monetary payment to obtaining disability status to being
prescribed a desired medication. A more subtle form of symptom exaggeration is
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dissimulation, which can include over or under reporting of symptoms (i.e., “faking
good”) and acting as though symptoms are better or worse than in reality (Sbordone,
Saul, & Purisch, 2007).
Survey results from several groups (i.e., Green, Rohling, Less-Haley, & Allen,
2001; Mittenberg et al., 2002) suggest base rates of malingering in cases of concussion
tend to hover around 30% in personal injury and disability litigation, whereas the rate
drops significantly in medical cases not involving possible compensation. However, some
research suggests that individuals may fail effort testing even in the absence of such
incentives. For example, approximately 11% of a group of 200 uninjured high school
athletes were found to complete neuropsychological assessment with suspect effort (Hunt
et al., 2007). More recently, 17% of 193 children ages 8 through 17 years were found to
have failed at least one objective measure of effort. Of the 33 children who failed effort
testing, only one case was thought to be influenced by litigation or incentives (Kirkwood
& Kirk, 2010). The high rates of malingering in the face of various incentives are of
concern when working with an individual presenting with concussion who may be
seeking such incentives, including monetary compensation, return to sports or work, or
accommodations in school. Equally important to concussion is the exploration of
dissimulation, which is currently absent from the literature in the area of concussion.
Effort is a serious concern in evaluating the impact of concussion specifically, as
well as performance on neuropsychological evaluations more generally. Psychologists
may be interested in identifying poor effort or feigned performance in forensic, medical,
and treatment settings and in cases in which an individual may receive benefits for
malingered impairment. Given that people who intentionally fake bad are not likely to
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self-disclose their malingering, it is important to identify those who may be faking. The
National Academy of Neuropsychology recommends several methods of assessing
symptom validity including evaluating consistency across measures, examining patterns
of neurocognitive test performance, using validity scales from psychological tests,
symptom validity tests, and forced-choice tests (Moser et al., 2005). Consistency can be
evaluated by comparing information across a variety of sources, such as the patient’s selfreport of symptoms with a medical history, comparing symptom reports with
observations of behavior, and evaluating whether response patterns are consistent with
known patterns of cognitive functioning. Further, performance on neurocognitive
measures can be considered against known patterns of invalid responding, inconsistency
between observations and test performance, or comparing test results and background
information or collateral reports.
Psychological tests, symptom validity tests (SVTs), and forced-choice tests are
perhaps the most well-known methods of exploring suspect effort or malingered
performance across forensic, clinical, and medical settings. Some psychological
measures, such as the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 (MMPI-2; Butcher
et al., 2001) and newly developed MMPI-2-Restructured Form (MMPI-2-RF; Tellegan &
Ben-Porath, 2008), have indices built into the measure to help determine whether the
individual responds reliably and consistently throughout the assessment. Specifically, the
MMPI-2 includes seven indices designed to identify feigned performance. These scales
are meant to identify the over-report of rare symptoms, the endorsement of obvious
symptoms of psychological disorders, the over-report of symptoms erroneously believed
to represent psychological dysfunction, and feigned severity of symptoms. Score
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elevations on one or more of these scales signals the clinician that the responses may not
be valid and additional exploration into the respondent’s effort is warranted. The validity
information on the MMPI-2 is extensive, and beyond the scope of the current review (see
Rogers, Sewell, Martin, & Vitacco, 2003). The MMPI-2 has been established as a reliable
and valid method for evaluating malingering in general (Rogers et al., 2003) and in cases
of concussion (Thomas & Youngjohn, 2009).
Symptom validity tests (SVTs) and forced-choice tests are specifically designed
to evaluate whether individuals are exaggerating their cognitive deficits on measures that
are easily passed by those with severe brain injury and/or compromised cognitive
aptitude. Symptom validity can be defined as the truthfulness of an examinee’s
presentation, self-report of symptoms, or neuropsychological test performance (Bush et
al., 2005). The Test of Memory Malingering (TOMM; Tombaugh, 1996) is a commonly
used SVT in the clinical setting. The TOMM includes two learning trials in which 50
common objects are individually presented. At the end of each learning trial, individuals
are presented with 50 recognition panels and the individual is asked to choose the item
that appeared in the learning trials. After a delay, a Recognition Trial is completed, where
the individual is again asked to choose the target item from the original presentations.
The TOMM has been shown to demonstrate high sensitivity and specificity to poor effort,
and accurately differentiate between those responding with full or poor effort (Rees,
Tombaugh, Gansler, & Moczynski, 1998).
Two commonly used examples of forced choice tests include the Word Memory
Test (WMT; Green, 2003; Green, Allen, & Astner, 1995) and the shortened version, the
Medical Symptom Validity Test (MSVT; Green, 2004). Forced-choice tests are
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commonly referred to as effort tests, and designed to identify an individual’s effort to
perform well (Bush et al., 2005). Both the WMT and MSVT were designed to appear to
measure verbal memory but instead provides an index of the validity of an individual’s
performance. Individuals are presented pairs of words, and asked to recall those words
immediately after presentation (Immediate Recall; IR) and following a delay (Delayed
Recall; DR). A Consistency (CS) score is calculated on how well the person performed
across IR and DR conditions. Effort is considered suspect if performance falls below the
criterion of 82.5% (WMT) or 85% (MSVT) on the IR, DR, or CS trials. A more thorough
discussion of the WMT and MSVT follows in the next section.
From this brief review of the methods used for evaluating effort, it has become
clear that effort is an important consideration when analyzing assessment data (for a
complete review of malingering, effort, and psychological assessment see Iverson, 2007
and Rogers, 2008). Regardless of the method employed, effort testing has become an
accepted and desired adjunct to psychological assessment, particularly when various
factors or incentives might influence examinee performance. Symptom validity tests and
forced-choice tests of effort provide an appealing method of identifying malingering;
performance that falls below chance or the cut-off is interpreted as evidence of deliberate
feigning, given that performance below criterion suggests that the respondent knew the
correct response and consciously chose the alternative (Orey et al., 2000). The use of
these measures is strongly recommended in assessments that bear on decisions to return
to work, play a sport, award compensation, decide competence, seek test
accommodations, and provision of treatment (e.g., by obtaining a diagnosis of ADHD, an
individual can gain access to stimulant medication). As the use of effort testing expands
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into clinical practice, it appears it is only a matter of time until effort testing is a standard
component across all clinical evaluations, whether the patient is referred for a medical,
psychiatric, neurologic, or educational evaluation.
Effort Testing and Concussion
Perhaps the most intriguing research in the area of concussion, effort, and
malingering has stemmed from the work of Green and colleagues (Green, 2007; Green,
Flaro, & Courtney, 2009; Green, Iverson, & Allen, 1999; Green, Rohling, Lees-Haley, &
Allen, 2001). Early work by these collaborators focused mostly on the comparison in
effort test failure by individuals with mild traumatic brain injury compared to individuals
with more serious brain injury (Green et al., 1999; Green et al., 2001). For example, the
authors (Green et al., 1999) administered several forced choice symptom validity
measures, including the Word Memory Test (WMT; Green, 2003; Green, Allen, &
Astner, 1995) to individuals with mild traumatic brain injury and moderate-to-severe
brain injury. Individuals in the mild head injury group showed significantly weaker
performance than the other groups across each of the scales of the WMT. Further, group
differences could not be explained by IQ or years of education as the groups were similar
across both. The authors noted the paradox between a minor injury and weaker effort test
scores and concluded it was unlikely the poor performance was caused by a minor injury.
Rather, they hypothesized that these participants purposely minimized their performance.
In another study Green et al., (2001) utilized a sample of 904 patients referred for
a neuropsychological assessment, 470 of which were head injury referrals. Each
individual was administered a comprehensive neuropsychological assessment that
included measures of executive functioning, memory and learning, verbal
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comprehension, attention and working memory, perceptual organization, psychomotor
skills, and symptom validity including the WMT (Green, 2003; Green et al., 1995). Test
results were converted into z-scores and a single index z-score was created for each
person to create an Overall Test Battery Mean (OTBM). Similarly, the authors created an
overall symptom validity (SV) z-score using symptom validity test data.
Using the entire sample of 904 participants, effort explained between 40–54 % of
the variance in the participants overall performance across neuropsychological measures.
The authors also explored the rates of effort test failure by referral source and diagnosis.
Patients referred by the Worker’s Compensation Board showed the highest rate of failure
at 35%, while 25% of individuals involved in personal injury litigation and 23% involved
in disability insurance claims failed effort testing. Individuals presenting with mild head
injury (with less than 24 hours of post-traumatic amnesia) showed a failure rate of 34%
while individuals with post-traumatic amnesia lasting more than one day showed an 18%
failure rate. Individuals presenting with neurological disorders showed a similarly low
rate of failure at 16%. These rates showed that individuals with monetary incentive to
appear impaired showed higher rates of effort test failure.
In exploring the differences between only those participants with head injury, the
authors separated the participants into groups based on the severity of injury. Overall, the
OTBM score difference between those with genuine mild head injuries and genuine
severe head injuries was .27 SD. Interestingly, the difference between those who failed
effort testing scored 1.21 standard deviations below those who passed effort testing. In
addition, individuals with mild head injury who passed the WMT (Green, 2003; Green et
al., 1995) scored .12 standard deviations below the normal mean, while those presenting
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with mild head injury who failed effort testing scored 1.24 standard deviations below the
normal mean. Finally, the authors found effort explained 53% of the variance in
neuropsychological test score performance, while education only explained 11% and age
only 4%. In addition, effort explained far more variance in neuropsychological test scores
than presence or severity of brain injury. In sum, individuals with mild head injuries who
failed effort testing tended to perform worse than their peers who passed effort testing
and individuals with more severe head injuries. Also, individuals who were faced with
monetary incentive and had mild injuries showed higher rates of effort test failure than
those with more significant head injury in the absence of monetary incentive. Together,
these results suggest that effort impacts neuropsychological test performance more than
head injury severity, age, and education.
In a 2007 follow-up study, Green utilized the same participant data with the
addition of 403 consecutive cases that presented for neuropsychological evaluation. As
with the previous study, referral sources often included Worker’s Compensation, private
insurance companies, and lawyer recommendation. The methods and measures used
mirror those from the 2001 study.
Of the total sample (n = 1,307), 31% failed effort testing by scoring below 82.5%
on any one of three WMT (Green, 2003; Green et al., 1995) scales. Scores of those who
failed effort testing were then compared with scores of 25 individuals with diagnosed
dementia. Those who failed effort testing showed weaker performance that those with
dementia across the early measure of the WMT (i.e., Immediate Recall and Delayed
Recall). Further, those who failed effort testing showed higher performance on the more
difficult subtests of the WMT; this pattern of responding suggests those who failed effort
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testing possess the cognitive skills to successfully complete the measure. The results from
neuropsychological testing were also similar when comparing the performance of those
who failed effort testing to those who passed; there was a significant difference between
those who passed and failed effort testing on measures of verbal memory, visual memory,
motor speed, working memory, performance IQ, and verbal IQ. Further, individuals that
passed effort testing but performed in the less than optimal range showed a predictable
reduction in test performance when compared to those who scored in the optimal effort
range. As with the previous studies, Green concluded that the effort with which an
individual completes testing explains more variance in test scores than brain injury or
other factors like education or age.
The most recent work of Green and colleagues (Green et al., 2009) explored rates
of effort test failure on both the WMT (Green, 2003; Green et al., 1995) and the
shortened version, the Medical Symptom Validity Test (MSVT; Green, 2004). The
authors utilized retrospective analysis of 163 individuals with moderate-to-severe
traumatic brain injury (MSTBI) and 309 individuals with concussion. A small
comparison group of healthy school-age children (ages 7–11) was recruited from
Canadian schools (n = 55). An additional comparison group was created retrospectively
from children referred for clinical assessment for a variety of diagnoses including fetal
alcohol syndrome, conduct disorder, and ADHD (n = 422). From this group of children, a
subgroup with developmental disorders and memory impairment was created (n = 25).
Two groups of adult participants were created. One group was asked to take the test with
full effort (n = 148) while the second was asked to simulate memory impairment in a way
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to avoid detection (n = 89). Two parallel groups of children were created (n = 81 and n =
27, respectively).
The authors presented the rates of effort test failure by group. All but 2 of 55
healthy children successfully passed the MSVT (Green, 2004) by scoring at or above
85% across the IR, DR, and CS subscales. The healthy adult participants instructed to
provide optimal effort showed similar performance with all but 7 of the 148 passing the
MSVT. All of the children and nearly all (87 of 89) of the adult simulators were able to
successfully feign memory deficits and fail the MSVT. From these data, the authors
found that the MSVT was able to accurately classify individuals who gave poor effect, as
they calculated an average sensitivity of 98.3% to poor effort. Further, the test was
determined to show a high specificity to poor effort (96%). Together, these data suggest
that the MSVT is useful in identifying individuals who approach testing with low effort
and is unlikely to give false positive results.
The authors compared the rates of failure of two clinical groups on the WMT
(Green, 2003; Green, et al, 1995) and the MSVT (Green, 2004): adults with mild TBI and
adults with moderate-to-severe MTBI (MSTBI). On the both the WMT and MSVT, the
mild TBI group showed a significantly higher rate of failure (48%) than the moderate-tosevere TBI group (48% to 22.7%, and 42% to 16%, respectively). Both groups showed a
significantly higher rate of effort test failure on both the MSVT and WMT than children
evaluated clinically. These findings suggest that failure on the easy MSVT subtests was 9
times more frequent in MTBI cases than in children with developmental disabilities.
The compendium of work by Green and colleagues (Green, 2007; Green et al.,
2009; Green et al., 1999; Green et al., 2001) has demonstrated that even children with
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developmental disabilities or memory impairment can pass effort tests such as the WMT
(Green, 2003; Green et al., 1995) and MSVT (Green, 2004) reliably, whereas adults
presenting with mild head injury and external incentives to malinger show significantly
higher rates of failure. In addition, adults with mild head injuries showed much higher
rates of effort test failure than their more seriously injured adult peers. Similarly, others
(Bianchini, Curtis, & Greve, 2006) found individuals with mild TBI were more likely
than their more severely injured peers to have positive hits on measures of malingering.
In addition, Green and colleagues (Green, 2007, Green et al., 2009) demonstrated that
individuals who fail effort testing also show a predictable and significant decline in
neuropsychological test performance. As stated clearly by Green, if we accept that MSVT
and WMT test failure in adults is the result of concussion, we must also accept that a mild
injury can cause memory impairment so severe that when compared to children with
documented memory or cognitive impairment, adults with concussion should be expected
to perform more than two standard deviations lower on standardized neuropsychological
measures. Instead, it seems a more likely conclusion is that adults with concussion
showed higher rates of failure across the MSVT and WMT because they approached
testing with less than optimal effort in an attempt to maximize impairment to obtain
monetary compensation. In support of this conclusion, the work of Green and colleagues
has consistently shown that adults with concussion showed a higher failure rate than
healthy and impaired children, child and adult simulators, and adults with documented
dementia. Further, effort consistently explained more than 50% of the variance in
neuropsychological test scores, far more than intellectual ability, age, or education. In
addition, it appears that a significant portion of individuals with concussion do not
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complete neuropsychological measures with their full effort, even simple tasks that can
be passed by children with developmental disabilities and documented memory
impairment.
Symptom Over and Under Reporting
Individuals with concussion may be motivated to modify their symptom reports
for a variety of reasons. As demonstrated by the work of Green and colleagues, some
individuals with concussion may be motivated by monetary incentives, such as Worker’s
Compensation, to over-report the symptoms of concussion. As effort testing has become
increasingly integrated into clinical practice, research has identified the relationship
between monetary incentives and the experience of prolonged post-concussion symptoms
(Bianchini et al., 2006). As discussed previously, the current estimates suggest that in
cases of financial compensation, approximately 30% of individuals are thought to involve
exaggeration of symptoms or impairment (Green et al., 2001; Mittenberg et al., 2002). In
sum, research suggests that individuals with concussion and monetary incentives are both
more prone to effort test failure and more apt to over-report the symptoms of concussion
than those without monetary incentive.
Alternative motivations to monetary incentives may exist for some individuals
with concussion who exaggerate their symptoms or impairment. For example, some may
be motivated to appear more impaired in an attempt to obtain academic accommodations.
Specifically, students that have suffered a concussion may require a variety of academic
supports to stay current with their work. These types of accommodations can include
reduction of homework, modified testing procedures (such as extended time or the
allowance of breaks), and/or increased flexibility in assignment requirements (Kirkwood,
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Yeates, & Wilson, 2006). These accommodations can be informal or provided through
either a Section 504 plan or an Individualized Education Plan (IEP; Kirkwood et al.,
2006). Typically, a student seeking formal accommodations at the post-secondary level
would be required to provide documentation of injury and deficit to their college Office
of Disability Services, which in turn would decide the appropriateness of educational
accommodations. Students with a recent history of concussion may perceive these
accommodations as incentives for a variety of reasons. Some students may believe that
that their academic ability has been diminished by the concussion and perceive that the
accommodations will help them perform to their academic capacity. In contrast, some
individuals who have been provided accommodations following concussion may have
found the accommodations to be helpful and seek to retain them even after the symptoms
of concussion remit. Additionally, some individuals without significant cognitive
disruption following concussion may be motivated to obtain desired accommodations by
manipulating symptom reports and minimizing test performance.
Student’s willingness to malinger symptoms of concussion to obtain academic
accommodations may not be surprising if we consider students from the general
population report they would prefer to have access to such testing accommodations
(Lang, Elliot, Bolt, & Kratochwill, 2008; Lewandowski, Lovett, Panahon, Lambert, &
Systma, 2012). As summarized by Frazier and colleagues (Frazier, Frazier, Busch,
Kerwood, & Demaree, 2008), students may be willing to simulate a learning disability
(LD) when faced with the potential of school failure, removal of previously obtained
accommodations, or exposed to increasingly demanding educational workload and
requirements. As high stakes tests, such as the Graduate Record Exam (GRE) and
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Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) have become inextricably linked to pre- and postsecondary academic success, students may be more likely to seek alternative methods of
increasing their performance (Banerjee & Shaw, 2007; Pitoniak & Royer, 2001).
Although accommodations are designed to help even the playing field for individuals
with disability and should theoretically not boost non-disabled individuals’ performance
(Pitoniak & Royer, 2001), they may be appealing for some non-disabled students to
pursue. Recent exploration into the rate of effort test failure in college students presenting
for screening evaluations to rule out a learning disability suggests failure rates of
approximately 20% (Osmon & Mano, 2008), with a similar estimate for students
presenting for ADHD screening (Harrison, 2006). This suggests that a substantial subset
of individuals who present for an ADHD or LD evaluation may falsify or exaggerate their
impairment.
In contrast to the individual who over-reports symptoms to obtain academic
accommodations, athletes with a history of concussion who are motivated to return to
play may be more likely to minimize their symptom reports (fake good) and perform
optimally on neuropsychological measures. Interestingly, some literature (Brooks, 2007)
suggests that adolescent athletes may be more likely to underreport their concussion
symptoms presumably to avoid being removed from play. The motivation for concealing
impairment can also involve the potential loss of one’s position or scholarship, letting
down teammates, coaches, and fans, missing out on professional opportunities, and being
considered a failure by fans and teammates (Barth et al., 1989). Despite the recent media
attention to the importance of preventing an early return to sports participation following
head injury, particularly in contact sports like football and hockey, there are no estimates
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of the percentage of athletes returning to play before the symptoms of concussion fully
remit.
The return to sports participation following concussion makes for an important
and sometimes controversial decision. Often, the decision is based largely on the
behaviors and symptoms reports of the athletes who may be motivated to return to play as
quickly as possible. If symptoms are not fully resolved, athletes may be at risk for
another concussion and more severe consequences (Sarmiento, Mitchko, Klein, & Wong,
2010). Although several sets of guidelines for return-to-play decisions exist, they all
concur that athletes must avoid contact sports until cerebral symptoms have subsided
(Swaine & Friedman, 2001). Further, the severity of the concussion and length of loss of
consciousness must be considered; those athletes with no or very brief loss of
consciousness should be removed from sports for a week while those with loss of
consciousness of longer duration should be removed for two weeks (Swaine & Friedman,
2001). In addition, both meetings of the International Conference of Concussion in Sport
(2001 and 2004; Aubry et al., 2002; McCrory et al., 2005) recommended that athletes
should not return to play until neuroimaging results are unremarkable and they are free of
signs or symptoms of concussion both at rest and after exertion. However, research has
found that athletes who reported they were symptom free still showed cognitive
impairment on a brief neuropsychological measure (Broglio, Macciocchi, & Ferrara,
2007). Similarly, others (Fazio, Lovell, Pardini, & Collins, 2007) found that concussed
student athletes who claimed to be asymptomatic performed worse than normal controls
and better than a group of symptomatic concussed athletes. These studies suggest that the
effects of concussion can linger, that those with concussion may not be able to accurately
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report when the cognitive effects or symptoms have resolved totally, that symptom report
is an insufficient method of monitoring the cognitive effects of injury, and that athletes in
particular may under report any problems in an effort to return to sports play.
Analog Research on Effort
The assessment of individuals with concussion requires information from multiple
methods and sources rather than self-report alone. Ideally, symptom report would be
augmented by neuropsychological test results and effort testing. All need to be
interpreted within the context of the possible motivations for maximizing or minimizing
symptom reports and performance. In the concussion literature, the research on
performance in the context of incentives has focused almost exclusively on financial
incentives. Fortunately, research with other clinical disorders has examined other
contingencies that might affect one’s self report and performance on an assessment.
An area of research and clinical practice that has encountered similar
methodological and diagnostic issues as concussion is Attention Deficit Hyperactivity
Disorder (ADHD). The diagnosis of ADHD is primarily based on observation or report of
specific symptoms. Clinicians that assess individuals presenting with ADHD must often
rely on self-reports of non-specific symptoms for diagnosis (Harrison, Edwards, &
Parker, 2007). As with symptom scales for concussion, ADHD symptom checklists are
plagued by the non-specificity of some ADHD symptoms and prone to over identification
of individuals as positive for ADHD (Harrison, 2006). Unfortunately, self-report
questionnaires are also relatively easy to falsify in both concussion and ADHD.
Using a sample of healthy undergraduate students (n = 80), Jachimowicz and
Geiselman (2004) provided participants with the DSM-IV-TR (American Psychological
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Association, 2000) diagnostic criteria for ADHD. After studying the diagnostic criteria
for five minutes, the participants were asked to complete one of four diagnostic measures,
and respond as if they struggled with ADHD. The results indicated that 65-95% of
participants were able to successfully respond in a manner indicative of ADHD,
depending on the self-report measure used. Similarly, Harrison et al., (2007) found
ADHD takes little coaching to successfully fake. The authors assigned healthy university
students (n = 70) to one of two groups: Honest Normals or Faking. Participants in the
Honest Normals group were instructed to simply complete the measures with their best
effort. Participants in the Faking group were provided with the DMS-IV-TR diagnostic
criteria for ADHD and were instructed to perform in a manner indicative of ADHD.
Participants from both groups completed the Conners Adult ADHD Rating Scale
(Conners, Erhardt, & Sparrow, 1998) and the Woodcock Johnson Psychoeducational
Battery – Third Edition (WJ-III; McGrew & Woodcock, 2001). The results indicated that
participants in the Faking group were able to successfully modify their performance on
both the symptom report and cognitive measure. Also, when compared to a group of
students with verified ADHD diagnoses (n = 72) the Faking group showed weaker
performance across the cognitive measure. Collectively, research suggests that ADHD,
like concussion, is easy to fake.
Another similarity between ADHD and concussion is that there appear to be
incentives for some people to obtain a diagnosis. In cases of ADHD, these incentives may
include access to medication such as Ritalin that can be used or sold, and access to
special academic accommodations that may make school and standardized exams less
strenuous. There has been increasing concern that college students, for example, have
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caught on to how easy it is to obtain the diagnosis of ADHD and receive the
accompanying benefits. In fact, the number of diagnoses of ADHD in college age
students is increasing at an alarming rate (Harrison, 2006). Together, these circumstances
suggest that assessment of ADHD should include the evaluation of effort or symptom
validity.
As with concussion, those working with an ADHD population are forced to rely
on symptom reports of nonspecific symptoms that are completed by individuals who may
be motivated for a variety of reasons to appear impaired. As with concussion,
neuropsychological evaluations of ADHD typically incorporate symptom reports, selfreport questionnaires, and measures of neurocognitive function and general academic
achievement (Sullivan, May, & Gallaby, 2007). As in concussion, these test results can
then be used to determine whether an individual requires formal academic support
through a Section 504 or Individualized Education Plan (IEP). As with concussion, there
appears to be a growing trend in the literature to explore how individuals with ADHD
may modify their performance on these types of evaluations.
The research in the area of ADHD can also help to inform the process of
identifying individuals with a history of concussion who manipulate symptom reports and
neuropsychological test performance in an attempt to obtain academic accommodations.
In recent years, there has been a sharp increase in the number of adults and postsecondary students requesting an evaluation to explore the possibility of an ADHD
diagnosis (Harrison et al., 2007). As such, it has become increasingly salient to separate
those individuals with legitimate difficulties and those seeking secondary gain. Harrison
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(2006) estimated that approximately 20% of students seeking ADHD disability status at
the university level willfully fake their symptoms of ADHD.
A recent study by Sullivan and colleagues (Sullivan, et al., 2007) suggests the
estimates by Harrison (2006) may underestimate the rate of faking bad in university
students presenting for an ADHD evaluation. Using a university sample of students
presenting for an evaluation of ADHD, LD, or ADHD/LD combined, the authors found
significantly higher rate of WMT failure (47.6%) in individuals presenting with ADHD
than LD (15.4%) and ADHD/LD combined (9.4%). Overall, as participants’ presenting
with ADHD reported higher numbers of symptoms of ADHD, they also demonstrated
weaker performance across the WMT; this pattern of responding suggests that students
who presented for ADHD evaluations may have minimized test performance while
maximizing symptom report.
A similar study (Frazier et al., 2008) utilized healthy college students who were
randomly assigned to a control group, simulated ADHD, or simulated reading disability
(RD). Both simulated clinical groups were asked to pretend as though there were
experiencing difficulties in school, provided information on the benefits of academic
accommodations, and a brief description of disorder-specific symptoms. Participants in
both simulation groups were asked to fake in a convincing manner so as to avoid
detection. In the control condition, participants were asked to provide their best effort
throughout the evaluation. Several measures of effort were utilized, including the
Validity Indicator Profile (VIP; Frederick, 2003), Rey Fifteen Item Test (Rey FIT; Rey,
1964) and Victoria Symptom Validity Test (VSVT; Slick, Hopp, Strauss, & Thompson,
1997). As expected, the simulated ADHD and RD groups showed significantly weaker
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performance across all measures of symptom validity than the control group.
Interestingly, the authors also found that the RD group showed weaker performance than
the ADHD on verbal components of the VIP and VSVT, suggesting that they attenuated
their feigned performance to reading-specific tasks.
Based on these data, it appears those working with a university sample should
anticipate that a significant portion of students presenting for ADHD and LD evaluations
may not approach testing with their full effort. The estimates from 24.5% to 47.6 % of
poor effort in combined ADHD/LD and ADHD evaluations are similar to the estimates
found by others (i.e., Constantinou, Bauer, Ashendorf, Fisher, & McCaffrey, 2005).
Further, the results suggest that relying on self-report of symptoms alone appears
inappropriate, considering the ease with which symptom reports can by modified and the
relative insensitivity of self-report questionnaires to faking.
Interestingly, significantly less research has focused on the exploration of the
rates of effort test failure in students presenting with learning disabilities. One group
(Lindstrom, Lindstrom, Coleman, Nelson, & Gregg, 2009) compared performance on
several measures of effort across three groups: healthy controls, simulated learning
disabled, and legitimate learning disabled. The authors noted that a significant portion of
the individuals in the legitimate LD group had “motive to feign” although no further
explanation was provided. The results showed high rates of effort test failure in the
simulated LD group, ranging from 32% to 41% across WMT trials, and significantly
lower rates of failure in the legitimate LD (3–5%) and healthy control (<1%) groups.
As demonstrated by this review of the literature in the areas of concussion and
ADHD, analog studies represent a common method of exploring malingering (Demakis
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2004; Rogers & Cruise, 1998). As Rogers and Cruise explain, participants are randomly
assigned to malingering conditions and the results compared to parallel clinical samples.
The same authors found that participants were able to successfully modify their responses
on symptom reports to match the value of the incentive offered. Similarly, previous
analog research by Demakis (1999) demonstrated that undergraduates were able to
consistently perform similarly to actual malingerers on several neuropsychological
measures. Several authors have found the simulators’ scores on neuropsychological
measures are often similar to those of real-world comparison groups, such as individuals
with TBI (Sweet et al., 2000; Mittenberg et al., 1995).
Analog research represents an appealing method of studying malingering for a
variety of disorders. However, the use of analog design presents several limitations. Most
notably is the concern about the generalizability, or external validity, of the results
(Rogers & Cruise, 1998). As stated by Rogers and Cavanaugh (as cited by Rogers &
Cruise, 1998) analog research requires individuals to comply when asked to fake, while
in reality, malingerers fake when asked to comply. In relying on analog design to study
the complex relationship between malingered performance and test performance, the
potential exists to errantly assume the generalizability from an analog group to a clinical
group without regard for the contributions of the injury or disorder to performance. In
addition, the setting of analog research may result in decreased ecological validity.
Analog studies are often conducted in groups, in a lab setting, without actual
ramifications or incentives for responding in the instructed manner. In actuality,
individuals who malinger face a variety of incentives or consequences for their
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performance, and complete their evaluation individually with a psychologist or
neuropsychologist.
Despite the limitations inherent to their use, analog designs provide a method to
explore the phenomena that may not be feasibly studied with a large-scale clinical study.
More specifically, it is difficult to study patterns malingered or low-effort performance as
those who malinger may be unwilling to admit it. By conducting analog studies,
researchers are able to identify potential correlates of malingered performance in a group
provided explicit instruction to malinger. These results provide insight into the methods
and patterns by which performance is simulated, thereby allowing more comprehensive
analysis of test data in practice. Lastly, simulation studies allow researchers to explore
the impact of explicit coaching on successful malingering, an unethical and problematic
practice when using a clinical group. Despite the limitations to generalizability,
simulation studies provide unique insight into the relationships between feigned
performance, incentives, and pre-assessment variables such as coaching, which would be
otherwise difficult to obtain using a clinical sample.
Current Study
Head injuries are very common, especially mild ones labeled as concussions.
Concussions are dynamic in nature, and it appears that in most cases the brain injury
resolves quickly and completely. However, for some, effects of concussion may persist.
Typically, clinicians evaluate the effects of concussion through use of self-report
measures, which can be inaccurate, biased, and measure symptoms that are not specific to
concussion. The reliance on self-report measures is particularly problematic when
practical or psychological reasons exist for maintaining or denying symptoms. The use on
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self-report of the non-specific symptoms of concussion is aided by both traditional and
computerized neuropsychological testing, but the impact of effort on these measures is
unclear. In addition, both computerized and traditional neuropsychological testing are
prone to problems of performance validity as studies have found high rates of
malingering (validity failure) among those with brain injury and other clinical groups
(i.e., ADHD) that encounter incentives. The need for additional study of the relationship
between non-monetary incentives, concussion, and symptom report is clear as no study as
yet has investigated both symptom exaggeration (fake bad) and symptom repression (fake
good) of concussion in the same study.
The current study sought to examine two realistic incentive scenarios that could
influence the test performance of students with concussion. All participants were
provided identical instructions on concussion: they were asked to pretend as though they
sustained a concussion and provided with the common symptoms of the injury. The
manipulation occurred when one group was provided instruction to pretend to be college
athletes faced with the return to sports participation (Fake Good), and another group
asked to pretend to be college students preparing for a high stakes exams faced with the
attainment of academic accommodations (Fake Bad). The third group was provided no
additional information (No Incentive). All participants were asked to keep all information
in mind while completing the questionnaires and psychological measures.
The current study was designed to answer several questions that arise from the
current trends in research and gaps in our understanding of the relationships between
external motivation, concussion, and neuropsychological testing. First, the study was
designed to replicate the results found by others (Harrison et al., 2007; Jachimowicz &
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Geiselman, 2004) that suggest individuals who are provided scripts and a description of a
disorder (i.e., concussion) can respond similarly to individuals with that disorder. At the
most basic level, it was expected that participants would be able to modify their response
patterns in a manner that is similar to individuals with an actual concussion.
Assuming that participants would be able to successfully simulate a concussion,
group comparisons by incentive condition were planned across several domains:
frequency of effort test failure, symptom report, and neuropsychological test
performance. Collectively, it was hypothesized that the groups would show a consistent
pattern of performance across these domains. Specifically, it was expected that the Fake
Bad group would show significantly weaker performance than the Fake Good and No
Incentive groups across domains. The Fake Bad group was expected to group to show the
highest rate of effort test failure, the highest symptom report, and the weakest
neuropsychological test performance. Given that it anticipated there would be an
adequate number of participants who failed effort testing, it was planned to compare the
neuropsychological test performance of individuals who passed and failed effort testing,
regardless of group.
Method
Participants
The current study utilized a college-age sample recruited through the Department
of Psychology research pool at Syracuse University. Potential participants were recruited
via SONA, the online system by which individuals in the subject pool are able view and
enroll for participation in studies. Additionally, participants were recruited via mass
email and campus flyers that provided details of the study and contact information for the
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investigator. A total sample of 198 students was recruited. G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder,
Lang, & Buchner, 2007) estimates for each of the planned statistical procedures
suggested the current sample size was adequate. Specifically, for the comparison of effort
test failure between three groups, a medium effect size (ɸc) of .25, alpha of .05, and a
power value of .80 with three groups, the total number of participants required for
sufficient results using chi-squared test was n = 155. For a one-way analysis of variance
on mean symptom report and correct SDMT items, respectively, using an effect size of
.25 (f), alpha of .05, and a power value of .80 with three groups, the total number of
participants required was n = 159. Using the same alpha and power values, the sample
size needed for analysis of neuropsychological variables (including the 4 composite
scores of the ImPACT), with the assumption of a small effect size of .10 (f), three groups,
and four response variables, was estimated to be n = 81.
From the total sample, data from three individuals was removed due to
withdrawal from the study, while data from two participants was removed for failure to
complete the demographic information. Of the remaining sample (n = 193), a small
portion had failed to indicate either their status as a college athlete (n = 4) or disability
status (n = 3). Given that no one participant was missing more than one item from the
demographic questionnaire, data from these participants was retained. Finally, students
who self-reported a learning disability (n = 8), attention disorder (n = 8), or multiple
disabilities including either a learning disability or attention disorder (n = 6) were
removed, leaving a final sample of 171 students.
Demographic information for each of the groups is summarized in Table 2. In
sum, 171 participants were included in this study, ranging in age from 18–24 years (M =
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19.41 years, SD = 1.47 years). The majority of the sample was female (65.5%), college
freshmen (52.6%), non-athletes (71.9%), non-disabled (96.5%), and had no history of
concussion (83.0%). Chi-square tests were used to explore whether the groups exhibited
significant differences across the demographic categories of sex, year in school, disability
status, athletic status, or concussion history. Given that multiple comparisons were run, a
Bonferroni correction was implemented and resulted in an alpha of .01. There were no
significant differences between the groups on sex χ² (2, n = 171) = 5.49, p = .06, year in
school χ² (2, n = 171) = 3.93, p = .69, disability status χ² (2, n = 168) = 1.71, p = .43,
athletic status χ² (2, n = 167) = 1.24, p = .87, or concussion history χ² (2, n = 171) =
10.76, p = .10. The results of a one-way analysis of variance showed there were no
significant age differences by group, F(2, 168) = .05, p = .95.
Measures
Manipulation Check.
Memory Complaints Inventory.
The Memory Complaints Inventory (MCI; Green, 2003) was used in the current
study as a manipulation check to evaluate whether participants manipulated their
performance as instructed. Group means from the General Memory Problems (GMP)
subscale score were compared to the mean GMP score of healthy adults provided by the
test creator. The percentage of participants in each group who had higher GMP scores
than healthy volunteers was also calculated.
The MCI (Green, 2003) is a brief, computerized program designed to measure an
individual’s self-reported memory complaints. The measure has 58 items, responded to
on a Likert scale, that comprise nine subscales: General Memory Problems, Numeric
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Process Problems, Visual-Spatial Problems, Verbal Memory Problems, Pain Interferes
with Memory, Memory Interferes with Work, Remote Memory Problems, Amnesia
Complex Behavior, and Amnesia Antisocial Behavior. The first six scales list common
memory complaints, while the final three include very rare and implausible memory
complaints. These scales were designed to identify individuals who purposefully
exaggerate memory complaints.
Exploration into the psychometric properties of the MCI is ongoing, although
some research is starting to suggest promising results (Flaro, Green, & Blaskewitz, in
press). More specifically, the MCI Total Score has shown low correlations with actual
measures of memory ability. Further, the MCI total score has been shown to more highly
correlate with other measures of effort, such as the Word Memory Test (Green, 2003).
These results suggest that the MCI shows divergent validity from well-validated
measures of memory and higher convergent validity with measures of effort. The MCI
took approximately ten minutes to complete.
Integrity of Intervention Form (IIF).
Subjects were asked to complete a brief questionnaire designed to evaluate
whether they adhered to the scripts (as did Demakis, 1999 and Gorny & Merten, 2005) to
help monitor the quality of the data collected. The IFF was designed to help descriptively
assess the extent to which participants understood and internalized the script. This
manipulation check included questions such as “How were you instructed to perform at
the beginning of the session today?” and “Do you feel you did a good job of action as you
were instructed?” The results from the IIF was used to create three categorical variables:
Consistency (whether the participant’s report of their condition matched the actual
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condition), Relative Performance (whether they participants felt they performed better
than, worse than, or similar to how they would have performed in the absence of any
instruction), and Simulation Success (whether the participant felt he/she did a good job of
acting as instructed by the script). A copy of the IIF has been included as Appendix A.
The IIF took approximately one minute to complete.
Effort Testing.
Medical Symptom Validity Test.
The computerized version of the Medical Symptom Validity Test (MSVT; Green,
2004) was used to assess effort. The MSVT presents individuals with ten word pairs
twice, and then asks them to identify words from the original list (Immediate Recall; IR).
After a delay of ten minutes, a recognition task is completed using different foils
(Delayed Recall; DR). A Consistency (CS) score is calculated on how well the person
performed across IR and DR conditions. The MSVT also included a Paired Recall (PR)
and Free Recall (FR) trials. In the PR trial, the individual is provided the first word of the
pair and the respondent required to provide the matched pair, whereas the FR trial
requires the individual to recall as many words as they can from the original list, in any
order. The PR and FR trial scores are considered more difficult than the IR, DR, and CS
trials, and are typically analyzed individually. If a person shows stronger performance on
the PR and/or FR trials than the IR, DR, or CS trials, it can be inferred the person
purposefully minimized their performance on the early subtests. MSVT data were used to
create a dichotomous variable labeled Effort Test Failure: Any individual who performed
below 85% on the IR, DR, or CS was considered to fail effort testing. This variable
corresponds to the clinical use of the MSVT to determine whether an individual provides
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valid or invalid effort during an evaluation. Conversely, individuals who scored at or
above 85% across the IR, DR, and CS scores were coded as passing. The decision to
dichotomize effort as pass of fail mimics the use of the MSVT clinically to evaluate the
validity of a respondent’s test results. The coding of the results from the MSVT as pass or
fail also corresponds to current practice in research (i.e. Green, 2007; Green et al., 2001).
The frequency of Effort Test Failure was compared by group.
The MSVT (Green, 2004) has been shown to demonstrate near perfect sensitivity
to poor effort in simulated adult and child malingerers (Green et al., 2009; Merten, Green,
Henry, Blaskewitz, & Brockhaus, 2005; Singhal, Green, Ashaye, Shankar, & Adams,
2009), and adults presenting for clinical evaluation (Carone, 2008). The MSVT has been
shown to be insensitive to legitimate cognitive impairment as Carone (2008)
demonstrated that even children with moderate-to-severe head injury pass at higher rates
than adults with mild traumatic head injury. Similarly, children with significant cognitive
impairment have been shown to pass the MSVT easily (Richman et al., 2006). Others
(Singhal et al., 2009) have demonstrated low rates of false positives in cases of adults
with documented dementia. Additionally, performance on the MSVT has been shown to
correctly highly to performance on the WMT, suggesting strong convergent validity
(Green, 2007). The MSVT, both immediate and delayed trials, took approximately fifteen
minutes to complete.
Symptom Report.
Postconcussion Scale.
The Immediate Post-Concussion Assessment and Cognitive Testing (ImPACT;
Lovell et al., 2000) includes a Postconcussion Scale that requires individuals to rate the
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presence of 22 common symptoms of concussion on a scale of 1 to 7. These scores
produce a Total Symptom Score. Total Symptom Score was compared across the groups.
The test creator provides norm-based classifications for healthy adults ranging from Low
to Very High. A variable was created, Symptom Impairment, with an unimpaired code
assigned to symptom scores that fell in the Low-Normal to Normal range, and an
impaired code assigned to score in the Unusual, High, and Very High range. This
variable was meant to simulate the clinical decision of determining when an individual is
free of symptoms in return to school, work, or play scenarios.
The Postconcussion Scale has been shown to possess high internal consistency for
both healthy (α = .88 - .94) and concussed individuals (α = .93) and shown high testretest reliability (.80) within the first several days of injury (Lovell, 2006).
Neuropsychological Testing.
Immediate Post-Concussion Assessment and Cognitive Testing.
The Immediate Post-Concussion Assessment and Cognitive Testing (ImPACT;
Lovell et al., 2000) was developed for use in an athletic environment and for use as a preand post-injury measure of the specific cognitive processes disrupted by concussion. The
four composite scores (Verbal Memory, Visual Memory, Visual Motor Speed, and
Reaction Time) were used as dependent measures to assess neuropsychological
performance across groups.
The ImPACT (Lovell et al., 2000) is a brief, computerized, neuropsychological
measure that takes approximately twenty-five minutes to complete and is scored
automatically. The ImPACT includes six individual subtests, each measuring a unique
component of cognitive functioning: Word Memory (verbal recognition memory), Design
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Memory (spatial recognition memory), X’s and O’s (visual working memory, processing
speed), Symbol Match (memory, visual motor speed), Color Match (impulse inhibition,
visual motor speed), Three Letters Memory (verbal working memory, processing speed).
These scores then produce four composite scores: Verbal Memory, Visual Memory,
Reaction Time, and Visual Motor Speed. Higher scores across the Verbal Memory,
Visual Memory, and Visual Motor Speed composites indicate stronger performance. A
lower score on the Reaction Time indicates stronger performance. The ImPACT test
creators provide norms for healthy adults across each of the four composites.
The ImPACT has been shown to demonstrate adequate psychometric properties as
Iverson et al., (2003) found rates of test-retest reliability of the composite scores to range
from .67 (Visual Memory) to .86 (Visual Motor Speed), with the Verbal memory (.70)
and Reaction Time (.79) composites falling in between. The ImPACT has also been
shown to be both sensitive (81.9%) and specific (89.4%) to the presence of concussion
when the Symptom Score and four composite scores are combined (Schatz et al., 2006).
The ImPACT composite scores have been shown to correlate with traditional
neuropsychological measures (Iverson, Franzen, Lovell, & Collins, 2004). Specifically,
the Visual and Verbal Memory composites showed a medium significant correlation to
the Brief Visuospatial Memory Test-Revised scores (BVMT-R; Benedict, 1997), which
did not correlate to other ImPACT composite scores (i.e., Processing Speed and Reaction
Time). Further, the Reaction Time and Visual Motor Speed composites have been shown
to correlate with other measures of processing speed, such as the Symbol Digit Modality
Test (SDMT; Smith, 1982). The Visual Motor Speed Composite has also been shown to
correlate with the Trailmaking Test. Collectively, these results provide examples of the
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convergent and divergent validity of the ImPACT composite scales. The ImPACT took
approximately twenty-five minutes to complete.
Symbol Digit Modality Test.
The number of items correct from the written version of the Symbol Digit
Modality Test (SDMT; Smith, 1982) was used in the current study as a secondary
measure of participant’s neurocognitive functioning. The SDMT is designed to measures
visual tracking, scanning, and motor speed. The measure presents individuals with a set
of unique symbols paired with a unique target number. Respondents are required to
quickly identify and write in the correct number for a series of symbols. The SDMT
number of items correct was used as a dependent measure in the current study. The
SDMT was chosen for use as previous research as it has been shown to be sensitive to the
immediate effects of concussion (Barth et al., 1989), and accurately discriminate between
individuals with head injury and healthy controls (Barr, 2001). The SDMT has also been
shown to correlate strongly with the Processing Speed and Reaction Time Composite
scores of ImPACT (Lovell et al., 2000). Additionally, the SDMT has been shown to
demonstrate stronger test-retest reliability than the ImPACT, ranging from .80 (Barr,
2001) to .82 (Hinton-Bayre & Geffen, 2005). The SDMT also shows strong correlation to
other measures of attention, concentration, and processing speed, including the Digit
Symbol subtests of previous versions of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (Barr,
2001). The SDMT, including the teaching trial, took approximately three minutes to
complete.
A summary of the domains of measurement and corresponding measures is
provided in Table 3.
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Demographic Information.
Demographic Information Form.
Subjects were asked to complete a brief questionnaire that recruited information
about their age, educational level, athletic status, concussion history, and disability status.
The Demographic Information Form has been included as Appendix B. The measure was
designed to help identify individuals who met exclusionary criteria based upon diagnoses
of attention and/or learning disabilities. In addition, demographic characteristics were
examined to describe each group and ensure equivalence across the groups on the
aforementioned demographic categories. The demographic form took approximately two
minutes to complete.
Group Membership.
Script of Experimental Condition.
The scripts were constructed such that participants in each group were asked to
pretend they had sustained a concussion and provided the common list of symptoms. As
the work of Gorny and Merten (2005) suggests, the more detailed the information
provided to the participants, the more likely they will be able to successfully minimize
their effort while also avoiding effort test failure. Injury-related information, such as
method of injury and the common symptoms of concussion are held constant in each
incentive condition. Each script provided a unique, but parallel, incentive condition:
academic accommodations (Fake Bad), return to play (Fake Good), or no incentive. The
incentive conditions between the Fake Good and Fake Bad groups were designed to
present parallel but opposing motivations for simulating performance. The Fake Bad
group was provided the following incentive condition:
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You are also being asked to pretend that you are currently a senior in
college and preparing to take the Graduate Record Exam (GRE). The test
is next weekend. If you do well on the GRE, your chances of getting into
a good graduate program are greater. If you do poorly on the GRE, you
will likely have to wait to apply to graduate programs until you are able to
get more experience in your area of study.
College students who have a concussion can qualify for extended time on
the GRE. To ensure you receive extended time on the upcoming GRE,
you will need to perform on the following tasks in a way that suggests you
are suffering from the symptoms of concussion.
Please keep all of this information in mind as you complete the following
measures.
The Fake Good group was provided the following incentive condition:
You are also being asked to pretend that you are a senior in college and
the starting point guard on the basketball team. The big game is next
weekend. If you do well in the game, your chances of getting onto a good
professional team are greater. If you do poorly in the game, you will
likely have to wait to try out for professional teams until you are able to
get more experience at your position.
College students who have a concussion can be removed from athletic
competition to avoid further injury. To ensure you can play in the
upcoming game, you will need to perform on the following tasks in a way
that suggests that you are not suffering from the symptoms of concussion.
Please keep all of this information in mind as you complete the following
measures.
Prior to use in the current study, the experimental scripts were piloted with
volunteers recruited from the Psychology Department at Syracuse University. The
volunteers included graduate and undergraduate research assistants. Volunteers were
randomly assigned scripts from one of the three conditions and asked to complete a brief
symptom report adapted from the ImPACT Postconcussion Scale (Lovell et al., 2000).
The results from this piloting showed the volunteers were able to understand the language
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of the scripts, internalize the incentive condition, and modify their symptom report as
instructed. The experimental script for each condition has been included as Appendix C.
Procedures
All data collection was conducted in a lab with ten computers connected to the
internet. Each of the data collection sessions were run by the primary investigator. Across
all sessions, the primary investigator tracked the steps completed using a copy of the
Experimenter Script (Appendix D). During 11 of 21 (52%) of the data collection
sessions, a research assistant was present to assist with procedural integrity and
administration of the protocol. In the experimental sessions, the procedural integrity
estimate was approximately 99%. The cause for disagreements came from word errors in
reading the script. Prior to the participants’ arrival, all computers were prepared by
loading the ImPACT (Lovell et al., 2000), MSVT (Green, 2004), and MCI (Green, 2003)
programs so that each participant completed all computerized measures on a single
computer. A blank piece of paper was placed over each computer screen to prevent
participants from engaging with the materials prior to use. A paper participant packet,
including the consent document, a written script of the experimental condition, SDMT,
MSVT delayed, Integrity of Intervention Form, and Demographic Form was placed in
front of each computer, along with two pencils. All participant packets followed this
fixed order.
Upon presenting for participation, individuals were randomly assigned one of
three incentive groups: No Incentive, return to play (Fake Good), or academic
accommodations (Fake Bad). Every data collection session began with the primary
investigator explaining the study and reading the consent document aloud. All
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participants signed the paper-and-pencil consent document prior to participation in the
study. Participants were then asked to read the Experimental Script that described
concussion, the incentive condition, and instructions on how to perform to obtain the
incentive. Participants were given approximately five minutes to read the scripts.
Once participants had read the script, they were directed to remove the paper
covering their computer screen, instructed to read the ImPACT’s (Lovell et al., 2000)
instructions, and reminded to act in the manner described in the script. The ImPACT
program automatically prompted students through the Postconcussion Scale and each of
the six subtests. After the participants completed the ImPACT, the primary investigator
or research assistant accessed computerized version of the MSVT (Green, 2004), covered
the monitor with a piece of blank paper, and instructed the participant to wait quietly.
Once all participants had finished the ImPACT, participants were instructed to review
their paper script. They were given approximately one minute to review the information.
Next, they were reminded to act as instructed and directed to the MSVT loaded on their
computer screen. After participants completed the MSVT, the primary investigator or
research assistant minimized the MSVT, loaded the computerized version of the MCI
(Green, 2003), and placed a blank piece of paper over the computer screen. Participants
were instructed to sit quietly while waiting for the others to finish. When all the
participants had completed the MSVT, the participants were allowed to review their
scripts for another minute. Next, participants were reminded to perform in the manner
explained in the script, and directed to the computer screen where they were provided
instructions to complete the MCI. As participants completed the MCI, the primary
investigator or research assistant minimized the MCI, maximized the MSVT, placed the
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blank paper over the computer screen, and reminded the participant to sit quietly while
waiting for the other participants to finish. Once all participants had completed the MCI,
the participants were instructed to turn to the SDMT (Smith, 1982) in their participant
packet. Participants were provided instructions on how to complete the SDMT and asked
to complete the first ten items. The primary investigator and research assistant checked to
ensure each participant understood the task. Then participants were reminded to perform
in the manner instructed in their script, and administered the SDMT. Once all participants
completed the SDMT, they were instructed to return to the MSVT delayed task on their
computer screen; as participants finished, they were instructed to place the blank sheet
over the computer screen and sit quietly. Next, the participants were prompted through
the paper-and-pencil Paired Recall and Free Recall portions of the MSVT as a group.
Finally, the group was instructed to independently complete the Integrity of Intervention
Form and Demographic Information Form. Once all participants completed these forms,
the group was thanked for their help, asked to verify their identity for the purposes of
assigning credit, and given credit for participation via SONA. Each data collection
session lasted approximately 60 minutes.
Research Design and Statistical Analyses
The current study was designed as an analog study with a between-subjects
experimental design, with group being the primary independent variable. The dependent
variables of interest included: effort test failure (MSVT; Green, 2004), symptom
impairment, symptom report, and neuropsychological test performance (ImPACT; Lovell
et al., 2000, SDMT; Smith, 1982). A chi-square analysis was used to compare rates of
effort test failure between the groups and frequency of impaired-range symptom report by
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group. Follow-up pairwise chi-square analyses were adopted to further explore group
differences in effort test failure. Effect sizes corresponding to chi-square analyses were
Cramer’s phi (ɸc) for omnibus tests, while the phi coefficient (ɸ) for post-hoc
comparisons. Both Cramer’s phi and phi have similar ranges of interpretation as follows:
.10 small effect, .30 medium effect, and .50 large effect. To compare omnibus group
differences in symptom report, a Kruskal-Wallis (see next section) test was used, and
followed by Mann-Whitney post-hoc tests when omnibus group effects were found.
Effect sizes for Kruskal-Wallis tests were reported as eta-squared (µ²) and relied upon the
following conventions: .01 small effect, .06 medium effect, and .16 large effect. Effect
sizes for Mann-Whitney tests are reported as r with the following conventions for
analysis: .10 small effect, .30 medium effect, and .50 large effect. Group differences on
neuropsychological measures, including the SDMT and four ImPACT Index scores, were
compared using five separate Kruskal-Wallis tests with follow-up Mann-Whitney posthoc tests when omnibus group effects were found. Finally, five separate Kruskal-Wallis
tests were utilized to compare the differences in neuropsychological test scores in
individuals who passed effort testing and those who failed, regardless of group. Across
omnibus and post-hoc procedures, Bonferroni corrections were utilized to control for the
effect of repeated contrasts.
Results
Assessment for Violation of Assumptions
Exploratory data analyses (Tukey, 1977) were utilized to determine whether the
assumptions of parametric statistical procedures were met. Across all dependent
variables, the data did not follow a normal distribution and demonstrated significant skew
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and kurtosis. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of normality was used to evaluate the
significance of these effects. The results indicated that each of the dependent variables
followed a non-normal distribution for at least one of the groups (alpha level .05).
Accordingly, it was decided that analogous non-parametric statistical analyses would be
employed rather than attempting to transform the data. Thus, the Kruskal-Wallis one-way
analysis of variance was utilized to explore differences in symptom report by group and
Mann-Whitney U tests were utilized to explore post-hoc comparisons. The KruskalWallis test is analogous to ANOVA but tests group differences based upon ranks, rather
than means. Scores are ranked for each participant, and sum ranks are computed for each
group. The Mann-Whitney test is parallel to a t test for independent samples but does not
assume central tendency of the samples. Five separate Kruskal-Wallis tests were utilized
to examine group differences in each of the four ImPACT (Lovell et. al, 2000) Index
scores and SDMT (Smith, 1982) score. When omnibus group effects were identified, a
Mann-Whitney U post-hoc procedure was used to further explain group differences. Chisquare tests were used to explore the frequency of effort test failure and symptom
impairment between groups. Post hoc comparisons were made using chi-square tests with
the two groups of interest. Bonferroni corrections were employed to account for repeated
contrasts and the corresponding alpha levels are reported in the results section.
Results of the Manipulation Check
Before analyzing the data, group performance from the General Memory
Complaints subscale of the MCI (Green, 2003) was explored to determine whether
participants performed as instructed by their script. The MCI creators provide a mean
MCI score 7.11 (SD = 5.14) compiled from 108 healthy adults, to which mean group
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scores from the current study were compared. The Fake Bad group showed a mean MCI
score of 12.38 (SD = 4.97), the Fake Good group 2.58 (SD = 4.67), and the No Incentive
group 11.26 (SD = 6.57). Additionally, 81.13% of the participants in the Fake Bad group
showed a mean MCI score greater than 7.11, while 67.89% of the No Incentive
participants obtained a higher MCI average than the healthy adults. Only 9.68% of the
Fake Good participants showed a higher MCI mean score than the healthy adults. In sum,
these patterns of performance indicate that the Fake Bad group endorsed more memory
complaints than both healthy adults, and members of the Fake Good and No Incentive
groups. These results are commensurate with the expectation that the Fake Bad group
would report the highest number of memory complaints, with the Fake Good and No
Incentive groups reporting fewer. Further, the results indicate that the manipulation was
effective in influencing participants self-reported memory complaints.
Data collected from the IIF further supported the effectiveness of the
manipulation. First, the Fake Bad and Fake Good groups were able to accurately recall
their experimental condition, as 96% and 89% of participants correctly identified group
membership, respectively. Of the No Incentive group, 59% of the participants correctly
identified their condition. The consistency score varied significantly by group, χ² (2, n =
171) = 28.43, p < 0.001, ɸc = 0.41. Of the entire sample (n = 171), 81% of participants
were able to correctly identify their condition. Relative performance data revealed that
participants in the Fake Good group tended to report that they performed as instructed,
with 90% reporting they performed similar to or better than they would have absent
specific instructions. A majority of participants in the Fake Bad group, 68%, reported
they performed worse than typical. Of the No Incentive group, 45% indicated they
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performed worse than typical, 27% indicated they performed as well as usual, and 28%
indicated they performed better than usual. Across groups, participants reported they did
a good job of performing as instructed with 87% of the Fake Good group, 83% of the
Fake Bad group, and 73% of the No Incentive group reporting successful simulation.
Together, the results from the IIF and MCI (Green, 2003) lend credence to the
assumption that participants would perform as instructed by their experimental scripts.
Given that participants were able to successfully modify a self-report of memory
complaints, identify their experimental condition, match test performance to their
condition, and were satisfied with their adherence to the protocol, it was assumed that the
scripts were sufficient to produce the intended alteration of performance across domains.
Symptom Report
Based upon the successful manipulation and the a priori hypothesis that symptom
report would vary by group, group differences in symptom report from the
Postconcussion Scale of the ImPACT (Lovell et al., 2000) were explored. The
Postconcussion Scale produces a Total Symptom Score for each participant, which were
compared between groups using a Kruskal-Wallis test. The results indicated a large and
significant difference between the mean rank of symptom score by group, H(2, n = 171)
= 58.21, p < .001, µ² = .34, with the mean rank of 112.57 the Fake Bad, 48.07 for the
Fake Good, and 102.85 for the No Incentive groups. Follow-up pairwise comparisons
between the groups were conducted using the Mann-Whitney U test with a Bonferroni
correction for repeated contrasts (α = .017). The results indicated a large and significant
difference between the Fake Bad and Fake Good groups, U = 426.50, nˡ = 53, n² = 62, p <
.001, r = .51. The Fake Bad group had an average rank of 80.95, while the Fake Good
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had an average rank of 38.38. A moderate and significant difference was also found
between the Fake Good and No Incentive groups, U = 601.00, nˡ = 62, n² = 56, p < .001, r
= .41, where the Fake Good group had a mean rank of 41.19 and the No Incentive group
showing a mean rank of 79.77. No significant difference was found between the Fake
Bad and No Incentive groups, U = 1292.50, nˡ = 53, n² = 56, p = .25. The Fake Bad group
had an average rank of 58.61 while the No Incentive group had an average rank of 51.58.
To further explore the differences in symptom report by group, the impairment
variable created from the Postconcussion Scale norms (Lovell, et al., 2000) was used.
Each participant was given a dichotomous score of Impaired or Unimpaired. An
unimpaired code was assigned to symptom scores that fell in the Low-Normal to Normal
range, and an impaired code assigned to score in the Unusual, High, and Very High
range. A chi-square test was used to compare the frequency of impairment by group. The
results indicated a strong and significant difference by group, χ² (2, n = 171) = 43.03, p <
0.001, ɸc = 0.50. Follow up pairwise comparisons between the groups’ frequencies of
impairment were conducted using the Chi-square test with a Bonferroni correction for
repeated contrasts (α = .017). A strong and significant difference was found between the
frequency of impaired ratings of the Fake Bad and Fake Good groups, χ² (1, n = 115) =
30.16, p < .001, ɸ = .51. A moderately strong and significant difference was also found
between the Fake Good and No Incentive groups, χ² (1, n = 118) = 20.13, p < .001, ɸ =
.41. No significant difference was found in the frequency of impairment between the
Fake Bad and No Incentive groups, χ² (1, n = 109) = 3.93, p = .05. Within group analysis
of symptom impairment indicated that all participants in the Fake Bad group (n=53)
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reported impaired range symptom scores, while approximately 56% of the Fake Good
and 93% of the No Incentive groups reported Impaired range scores.
Overall, these results suggest the groups differed across both the frequency of
impairment and the average rank of symptom report. As expected, the Fake Bad group
reported significantly more symptoms and more frequently reported impaired range
symptoms than the Fake Good group. Unexpectedly, No Incentive group also reported
more frequent impairment and more symptoms than the Fake Good group. Together,
these results partially confirm the hypothesis that the Fake Bad group would show
significantly higher symptom report than the Fake Good group and No Incentive group.
These results are summarized in Tables 4, 5, and 6.
Neuropsychological Test Performance
It was expected that the Fake Bad group would perform significantly worse than
the No Incentive and Fake Good groups across measures of neuropsychological test
performance, including the ImPACT (Lovell, et al., 2004) composite scores and the
SDMT (Smith, 1982). Group performance across each of the four composite scores of the
ImPACT and SDMT was explored by using five separate Kruskal-Wallis tests. A
Bonferroni correction was employed given the number of tests run, which resulted in an
alpha of .01. The groups showed significant differences in performance across each of the
neuropsychological scores: Verbal Memory, H(2, n = 171) = 37.31, p < .001, µ² = .22,
Visual Memory, H(2, n = 171) = 34.23, p < .001, µ² = .20, Visual Motor Speed, H(2, n =
171) = 32.28, p <.001, µ² = .19, Reaction Time, H(2, n = 171)=14.89, p = .001, µ² = .09,
and SDMT score, H(2, n = 171) = 33.20, p < .001, µ² = .20. Across the ImPACT
composite scores and SDMT, the groups showed the same pattern of responding, with the
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Fake Bad group showing the weakest performance, followed by the No Incentive group,
and the Fake Good group showing the strongest performance. These results are
summarized in Table 7.
To further evaluate the significance of group differences across each of the
ImPACT (Lovell et al., 2000) composite scores and SDMT (Smith, 1982), pairwise
comparisons between the groups were conducted using the Mann-Whitney U test with a
Bonferroni correction for repeated contrasts (α = .0025). The results indicated that the
Fake Bad and Fake Good groups showed significantly different performance across each
of the ImPACT composites and SDMT, with the Fake Good showing significantly
stronger performance across the measures: Verbal Memory, U = 634.50, nˡ = 53, n² = 62,
p < .001, r = .53, Visual Memory, U = 709.50, nˡ = 53, n² = 62, p < .001, r = .48, Visual
Motor Speed, U = 674.50, nˡ = 53, n² = 62, p < .001, r = .51, Reaction Time, U =
1023.50, nˡ = 53, n² = 62, p = .001, r = .32, and SDMT, U = 622.00, nˡ = 53, n² = 62, p <
.001, r = .53. The results further suggested small (Reaction Time) to moderate (Verbal
Memory, Visual Memory, and Visual Motor Speed) effect sizes for the significant
differences between the groups across the ImPACT and a large effect size across the
SDMT. The results indicated that the No Incentive group showed significantly weaker
performance than the Fake Good group across each of the ImPACT composites and
SDMT: Verbal Memory, U = 923.00, nˡ = 56, n² = 62, p < .001, r = .40, Visual Memory,
U = 871.00, nˡ = 56, n² = 62, p < .001, r = .43, Visual Motor Speed, U = 1025.50, nˡ = 56,
n² = 62, p < .001, r = .35, Reaction Time, U = 1174.50, nˡ = 56, n² = 62, p = .002, r = .28,
and SDMT, U = 1048.00, nˡ = 62, n² = 56, p < .001, r = .34. The results suggested small
(Visual Motor Speed and Reaction Time) to moderate (SDMT, Verbal Memory, and
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Visual Memory) effect sizes for the significant differences between groups. As with the
previous findings in the domains of symptom report and effort testing, the Fake Bad and
No Incentive Groups were not found to differ significantly across the ImPACT composite
scores or SDMT: Verbal Memory, U = 1157.00, nˡ = 53, n² = 56, p = .05, Visual Memory
(U = 1308.50, nˡ = 56, n² = 62, p = .29, Visual Motor Speed (U = 1176.00, nˡ = 56, n² =
62, p = .06), Reaction Time (U = 1350.50, nˡ = 56, n² = 62, p = .42), and SDMT, U =
1224.00, nˡ = 56, n² = 62, p = .115. These comparisons are summarized in Table 8.
Effort Testing
Data collected from the Medical Symptom Validity Test (MSVT; Green, 2004)
produced five scores: Immediate Recall (IR), Delayed Recall (DR), Consistency (CS),
Paired Recall (PR), and Free Recall (FR). Group performance on the MSVT is
descriptively summarized in Table 9. As indicated by the user manual, individuals are
considered to have given suspect effort with a score of < 85% on IR, DR, or CS (Green,
2004). A variable was created to capture performance across these three subtests such
that performance below 85% on any one of these three scores was coded as an effort test
failure, and performance of 85% and above across the subtests was coded as an effort test
pass. To test the hypothesis that the groups would differ in their rate of effort test failure,
the percentage of group members who passed effort testing was calculated for each
group. It was hypothesized that the Fake Bad group would show the highest rate of effort
test failure with the No Incentive and Fake Good groups showing significantly lower
rates of failure. As expected, the Fake Bad group showed the lowest rate of passing effort
testing with 35.8% of the group passing; the No Incentive had a passing rate of 55.4%,
while the Fake Good group had a passing rate of 96.8 %.
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To further explore group differences in MSVT (Green, 2004) performance, the
frequency of effort test failure by group was compared using a chi-square test. The results
showed significantly different rates of effort test failure by group, χ² (2, n = 171) = 49.14,
p < .001, ɸc = .54. Follow up pairwise comparisons between the groups were conducted
using chi-square tests with a Bonferroni correction for repeated contrasts (α = .017). A
strong and significant difference was found between the frequency of effort test failure of
the Fake Bad and Fake Good groups, χ² (1, n = 115) = 49.32, p < .001, ɸ = .66. A
significant and moderately strong difference was also found between the Fake Good and
No Incentive groups, χ² (1, n = 118) = 28.60, p < .001, ɸ = .49. A significant difference
was not found in the frequency of effort test failure between the Fake Bad and No
Incentive groups, χ² (1, n = 109) = 4.17, p = .04. The results from the MSVT are
summarized in Table 10.
To explore the relationship between effort test failure and neuropsychological test
performance, five Mann-Whitney U tests were utilized to compare those who passed
effort testing and those who failed (regardless of group membership) across each of the
neuropsychological measures. A Bonferroni correction was utilized to reflect the large
number of repeated contrasts (α = .01). Significant group differences were found across
each of the neuropsychological measures: Verbal Memory, U = 700.00, nˡ = 61, n² = 110,
p < .001, r = .65, Visual Memory, U = 958.00, nˡ = 61, n² = 110, p < .001, r = .59, Visual
Motor Speed, U = 999.50, nˡ = 61, n² = 110, p < .001, r = .58, Reaction Time U =
1415.50, nˡ = 61, n² = 110, p < .001, r = .48, and SDMT U = 1010.50, nˡ = 61, n² = 110, p
< .001, r = .58), such that those who passed effort testing showed significantly stronger
performance across each measure. Table 10 includes a summary of these data.
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Collectively, these results partially confirm the hypothesis that the groups would
show significantly different performance across neuropsychological measures. A
significant omnibus effect for group was found across the ImPACT (Lovell, et al., 2000)
and SDMT (Smith, 1982), with the Fake Bad group showing significantly weaker
performance than the Fake Good group across measures. Unexpectedly, the No Incentive
group showed similar performance to the Fake Bad group, and significantly weaker
performance than the Fake Good group, across each of the neuropsychological measures.
The results showed that individuals who passed effort testing showed significantly
stronger performance than those who failed, across neuropsychological measures.
Discussion
The purpose of the current study was to evaluate whether incentives for
modifying performance would influence the symptom report, neuropsychological test
performance, and effort test failure in individuals instructed to pretend as though they had
recently sustained a concussion. The results support two major findings. First, the data
suggest that the symptoms and neurocognitive impairment of concussion can be faked.
Second, poor effort is of significant concern when evaluating neuropsychological test
data.
The results of the current study showed that the symptoms of concussion are
easily faked in both directions. As expected, the Fake Bad group showed a higher rate of
impairment than the Fake Good group as measured by the Postconcussion Scale of the
ImPACT (Lovell et al., 2000). The No Incentive group, which was only provided
information on the symptoms of concussion, also showed a higher impairment rate than
the Fake Good group. Further, 100% of the Fake Bad group reported Impaired range
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symptoms, while 93% and 56% of the No Incentive and Fake Good group participants
reported Impaired range symptoms, respectively. These results provide support to the
conclusion that even after a short exposure to a list of symptoms, participants instructed
to fake bad were able to modify their symptom report to match clinical levels. When
compared to the symptom report of athletes with concussion provided by the ImPACT
manual (Lovell, 2006), participants in the No Incentive and Fake Bad groups showed
higher symptom report. In both the current study and comparable studies (Harrison,
Edwards, & Parker, 2007; Martin, Hayes, Gouvier, 1996), participants were able to
willfully create symptoms indicative of impairment related to ADHD and concussion,
respectively. These data illustrate the need for multiple measures of impairment when
working with individuals who present with common symptoms of concussion, such as
headache, fatigue, and irritability, who may have an incentive to exaggerate or fake
symptoms.
The current study also identified significant differences in neuropsychological test
performance by group. The No Incentive and Fake Bad group showed consistently
weaker performance across neuropsychological measures than the Fake Good group.
Group membership was found to account for between 9-22% of the variance in
neuropsychological test scores. Collectively, these results provide evidence that
individuals in the Fake Bad and No Incentive groups, who over-reported the subjective
symptoms of concussion, also showed a decline in their objective performance on
commonly used psychological measures. Although the current study did not recruit a
comparison group of individuals with legitimate concussion, others have evaluated the
neurocognitive performance of individuals with concussion using similar methods as the
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current study. Specifically, Broglio, Macciocchi, and Ferrara (2007) administered the
ImPACT (Lovell et al., 2000) to a small sample (n = 21) of concussed college athletes.
Other investigators (Iverson, Lovell, & Collins, 2005; Schatz, Pardini, Lovell, Collins, &
Podell, 2006) tracked the neurocognitive performance of concussed high school students
following concussion. Both the Fake Bad and No Incentive groups from the current study
showed weaker performance across the ImPACT composites and SDMT (Smith, 1982)
than individuals with legitimate concussion. Similar patterns of performance were found
in research on groups with concussion and ADHD (Green, 2007; Green et al., 2001;
Harrison, Edwards, & Parker, 2007; Martin, Hayes, & Gouvier, 1996). These studies
tended to show that not only are the general and subjective symptoms of certain disorders
and injuries easy to fake, but so are the neurocognitive deficits typically associated with
these disorders or injuries. These results also suggest that individuals who fake clinical
disorders show weaker performance than those with legitimate clinical diagnoses.
The current study also identified significant differences in the rate of effort test
failure by group. The Fake Bad group showed the highest rate of effort test failure
(64.2%), followed by the No Incentive group (44.6%), and the Fake Good group (3.2%).
Further, the Fake Bad and No Incentive groups showed a significantly higher rate of
effort test failure than the Fake Good group. The current results are similar to those found
by others (Green et al., 2009; Harrison, Edwards, & Parker, 2007) who reported that both
children and adults can easily modify their performance to pass or fail effort testing when
provided instruction to do so. Other studies have found that symptom validity tests are
insensitive to the effects of explicit instruction on how to perform in a manner to avoid
detection (Brennan, Meyer, David, Pella, Hill, & Gouvier, 2009; Jelicic, Ceunen, Peters,
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& Merckelbach, 2011). However, these studies are not specific to concussion, and more
research in the area of effort testing needs to be completed before conclusions can be
made about the sensitivity of effort tests to feigned head injury. Further, these results
suggest that non-monetary incentives, such as the return to sports participation or the
provision of academic accommodations, can influence performance in a significant and
predictable manner. While research in the area of ADHD and learning disabilities
(Constantineau et al., 2005; Harrison, 2006; Sullivan et al., 2007) has begun to suggest
that a subset of students willfully malinger symptoms in an attempt to obtain academic
incentives, these results are the first to suggest the incentives may be appealing to
individuals with concussion. Additionally, recent work has shown that both typical and
disabled students rated extended time as a highly desirable test accommodation, 87.1%
and 88.3% respectively (Lewandowski, Lovett, Panahon, Lambert, & Systma, 2012).
Given the notion that even typical students may find academic accommodations to be
appealing incentives, and the ease with which the common symptoms of concussion can
be simulated, the need for increased awareness and use of effort measures is clear.
While group membership accounted for a significant portion of the variance in
neuropsychological test scores, effort also played a significant role in performance. Those
who passed effort testing showed significantly stronger performance across
neuropsychological measures. These results indicate that effort, regardless of incentive
condition, explained between 23% and 42% of the variance in neuropsychological test
performance. These findings are consistent with those of Green et al. (2001) who found
that effort explained 53% of the variance in neuropsychological test performance of
individuals with head injury. In the same study, education (11%) and age (4%) accounted
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for far less variance than effort. Overall, these results provide compelling evidence that
effort should be considered when analyzing neuropsychological test results, especially
when the individual may have incentive to fake bad.
Surprisingly, across all measures the No Incentive group consistently performed
in a manner similar to the Fake Bad group, rather than the Fake Good group. Although it
was initially expected that the No Incentive group would show weaker performance than
the Fake Good group and stronger performance than the Fake Bad group across domains,
there exist several explanations for why an alternative pattern was observed. First, in the
No Incentive condition, participants were given no explicit information on how to modify
their performance. While all groups were provided information on concussion and the
common side effects, the Fake Good group was given explicit instruction to minimize
symptom report and maximize performance to ensure the return to athletic play. In
contrast, the Fake Bad group was instructed to maximize symptom report and depress test
performance. The lack of explicit instruction to the No Incentive group may have made it
more difficult for participants to assess how strong or weak to perform. This explanation
seems to be supported by several pieces of data. First, the No Incentive group showed the
most difficulty identifying its experimental condition, with 58.9% of the group correctly
reporting group membership. The No Incentive group was significantly less accurate than
the Fake Bad (96.2%) and Fake Good (88.7%) groups’ rate of correct identification. The
majority of the No Incentive group who incorrectly identified their group (56.5%)
reported they had been instructed to pretend they were a student preparing to take the
GRE, while the other 44.5% indicated they were instructed to pretend to be an athlete
seeking to return to play. Of the participants in the No Incentive group who incorrectly
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identified their group, only 35.8% (8 of 23) reported that they had not done a good job of
following the script. Of these participants, 87.5% reported they had become confused or
forgotten how to respond during the session. Interestingly, 55.3% of the No Incentive
condition participants reported that they performed the same as or better than they would
have in the absence of the experimental script. These data suggest that participants in the
No Incentive group may have been confused about their instructions or struggled to
anchor their performance to a reference point in the absence of actual impairment.
Despite the self-reported difficulties of the No Incentive group, it is important to note that
they appeared to internalize the experimental script. The group consistently performed in
a manner indicative of concussion, across measures. Although participants reported
confusion, they were able to successfully simulate impairment across measures.
Limitations
Despite the robust differences in symptom report, neuropsychological test
performance, and effort test failure by group, the current study is not without limitation.
The most salient of these limitations are inherent to the use of a simulation design,
including four characteristics: Lack of comparison groups, absence of true incentives,
language used in the scripts, and reliance on conscious motivations for performance.
Perhaps most notably, the study recruited a healthy sample of undergraduate
students, rather than concussed individuals. Also, the current study did not recruit a
comparison group of healthy participants, which would have provided frame of reference
for delineating the current results. It would have been valuable to compare symptom
report, effort test failure, and neuropsychological test performance to a healthy
comparison group recruited from the same population.
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Although comparison groups of concussed and healthy individuals were not
recruited, comparisons between the current study and similar research are informative.
When the data from the current study were compared to similar data collected from
concussed athletes (Broglio, Macciocchi, & Ferrara, 2007; Iverson et al., 2005; Schatz et
al., 2007), interesting trends emerge. First, athletes with concussion reported similar
symptom scores to the Fake Good group, which are much lower than those of the Fake
Bad and No Incentive groups. The Fake Good group showed a much larger range of
scores and higher variability in symptom report than both concussed athletes and the
Fake Bad and No Incentive groups. Across the ImPACT (Lovell et al., 2000), the Fake
Good group showed stronger performance than concussed athletes and the Fake Bad and
No Incentive groups. Table 11 provides a summary of these data. This comparison, albeit
indirect, suggests that participants in the Fake Bad and No Incentive groups demonstrated
higher symptom report and weaker neuropsychological test performance than individuals
with concussion. This comparison also shows that individuals who simulate concussion
may actually perform worse than individuals with concussion. A similar pattern has been
demonstrated by the work of Green and colleagues (Green et al., 1999; Green et al.,
2001; Green et al., 2009). Work in the areas of ADHD and learning disabilities have also
shown that individuals who fake bad tend to perform worse than those with legitimate
diagnoses (Harrison et al., 2007; Lindstrom et al., 2009).
A secondary effect of failing to include a healthy comparison groups is that it is
difficult to evaluate whether participants in the Fake Good group were able to optimize
their performance. However, it is valuable to consider the low rate of effort test failure
(3.2%) demonstrated by the Fake Good group is than the rate of effort test failure in
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healthy volunteers in the absence of incentives, which has been shown to range between
11-17% (Hunt et al, 2007; Kirkwood & Kirk, 2010). In comparing the No Incentive
groups to test-based norms from the MCI (Green, 2003), the No Incentive group reported
fewer general memory complaints. These data provide some evidence to suggest that the
Fake Good group in the current study appeared to purposefully maximize test
performance.
The results from the current study are further limited in that participant’s actual
performance had no implications for the attainment of academic accommodations or the
return to athletic play. More specifically, while the incentives used represent “real world”
scenarios that may influence performance, the current study did not provide actual
incentives for performance. Regardless of experimental group, participants’ performance
had no legitimate consequence for their academic and athletic standing, or even the credit
they earned for participating in the experiment. Further, given that no real incentive was
attached to performance, it seems unlikely that the same cognitive or emotional demands
of malingering were activated in the participants. Also, the incentives presented in the
current study may not have represented salient goals for the participants, given that they
represented a healthy, uninjured sample. Despite the lack of realism with the incentives,
robust effects were found across symptom report and neuropsychological test
performance by group and highlight future directions for research.
The experimental scripts may have also limited the internal validity of the current
study. This appears to salient concern for the No Incentive condition, in which
participants had more difficulty than participants from the other groups correctly
identifying their experimental condition and reported they became confused about how to
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perform. Simply put, a substantial portion of the No Incentive group simply did not know
how to perform. This finding is interesting in that it suggests that individuals can more
easily fake a disorder when provided explicit instruction on how to do so.
Of additional concern are the participant’s conceptions of the information
contained within the experimental scripts. The current study required participants to
pretend to have sustained a minor head injury, but also pretend to be seeking an external
gain. Both simulation factors could be susceptible to individual differences of the
participants. For example, participants may have varied in their conceptualization of
symptoms of concussion. Across groups, participants were asked to imagine they had
sustained a concussion as a result of a car accident; some participants may have imagined
a minor car accident, while others imagined a major collision. Participants in the Fake
Bad and Fake Good groups were also asked to pretend to be preparing for the Graduate
Record Exam or an important basketball game. For some students, these may not have
represented important incentives, and this may have impacted their ability to assume the
instructed role. Participants may have varied in their ability to estimate how they would
perform on such tests normally let alone how to perform given an imaginary incentive. It
is conceivable that it may have been difficult for participants to keep their typical
performance, injury scenario, and incentive condition in mind while attempting to
complete the measures. Although participants were frequently prompted to review their
experimental script, it may have presented a cognitive challenge to continually monitor
performance. Some participants may have varied in their willingness to purposefully
modify their performance, regardless of condition. Subjects were provided an opportunity
to disclose poor adherence to the protocol, without penalty, via the Integrity of
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Intervention Form, but some participants may not have felt comfortable disclosing their
failure to act as instructed.
It is important to note the lack of standardization of the experimental scripts.
Although the scripts were designed to be equivalent in length and content, they were
created by the author for use in the study. The verbiage used may have influenced group
performance, in addition to the incentive presented. For example, each of the groups was
told that concussion represents a mild head injury. Further, each of the groups was primed
to pretend that they had recently sustained a concussion. It appears that these factors may
have influenced group performance in several ways. First, it seems that individuals in
each of the groups showed high reliance upon the experimental scripts. The Fake Bad
group, despite being told to exaggerate impairment, showed similar performance to the
No Incentive group. This suggests that the Fake Bad group may have relied heavily upon
the clue of mild head injury. Conversely, the No Incentive group, absent incentive,
appeared to rely upon the information about impairment and symptoms, and successfully
simulated concussion. The influence of the script and the salience of the information may
partially explain why the Fake Good group showed a higher report of symptoms than
what may be expected. It will be important that future research explore the components
of script that appear to be most related to feigned performance.
In the current study, poor performance (i.e., elevated symptom report, low
neuropsychological test performance, and effort test failure) was conceptualized as a
conscious choice. Individuals who failed effort testing were assumed to have done so in
an attempt to appear impaired by concussion. However, this assumption ignores the
unconscious motivations that may influence their clinical presentation. For example,
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“diagnosis threat” was first used by Surh and Gunstead (2002) to explain how an
individual with concussion show low performance on a task because they are primed to
believe that individuals with concussion are generally regarded as performing poorly on
the task. It may be the case that simply exposing individuals to the symptoms of
concussion influenced their performance across measures, rather than the incentive
condition. Accordingly, it is plausible that there may be alternative, unconscious factors
that contributed to participants’ performance that went unmeasured. It may be the case
that exploring these unconscious factors would help explain effort test failure in 10-17%
of healthy individuals in the absence of incentives (Hunt et al, 2007; Kirkwood & Kirk,
2010).
With the limitations to the internal and external validity in mind, the results are
among the first to suggest that non-monetary incentives to modify performance may
influence the psychological test results in individuals seeking these incentives. Consistent
and robust differences were found between the Fake Good and Fake Bad groups across
measures of effort, symptom report, and neuropsychological test performance. The
importance of effort is highlighted as the current results show a strong and significant
relationship between effort and performance on neuropsychological measures.
Future Directions for Research
The limitations of the current study inform directions for future research. Given
the lack of generalizability to a clinical sample, it is imperative to explore the differences
in test performance between individuals with actual concussion with individuals
instructed to feign concussion. This will allow for a direct comparison of neurocognitive
performance between these groups.
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The current study suggests that the provision of academic accommodations and
return to sports play may be salient incentives to modify performance, especially in a
college setting. The current data suggest that concussion is easily faked, while others
have recently illustrated the desirability of academic accommodations (Lewandowski et
al., 2012). Continued exploration into the appeal of these incentives for individuals with
concussion will further inform our clinical practices. Concurrently, we should continue to
investigate whether healthy students find these (and other) incentives appealing enough
to modify symptom report and/or neurocognitive test performance. By measuring the
desirability of common incentives, such as access to monetary reimbursement, reduction
in work or school workload, sympathy from friends and family, and academic
accommodations, clinicians can more adequately screen for feigned performance when
these incentives are present. Related to the return to play incentive, it may be beneficial
to explore what factors contribute to an athlete’s willingness to minimize symptom
report. These factors may include the avoidance of monetary or opportunity loss, length
of season, or perceived threat of additional or long-term injury. A more comprehensive
understanding of the factors that contribute to feigned performance will aid in the
development of adequate screening methods.
As our knowledge of the relationship between incentives and neuropsychological
test performance grows, we should also seek to broaden the use of symptom validity
measures. Despite increasing awareness of purposeful underperformance on pre-season
baseline testing in professional sports (Leahy, 2011), little work has explored the
introduction of effort testing to baseline evaluations. This would allow us to quantify the
rate of faking bad at baseline. This data could help improve our current practices for
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screening both pre- and post-injury, and strengthen the validity of our return to play
decisions following injury. It would be interesting to explore how knowledge of effort
testing would influence performance. For example, if examinees are told their effort will
be measured prior to testing, would it influence performance (i.e., reduce malingering)?
This research may also have practical value; for example, it would be pertinent to
evaluate whether the introduction of effort testing to pre-season baseline testing protocols
would be an effective method of dissuading athletes from faking bad at baseline.
General Conclusions
Limitations aside, the current study demonstrated that concussion is an injury that
can be easily faked with little explicit coaching. The current results are among the first to
suggest that the symptoms of concussion can be easily modified in either direction, such
that individuals can both minimize and maximize their self-report of symptoms. This
finding has implications for the way in which we conceptualize incentives and suggests
that non-monetary incentives may represent desirable outcomes for some people. In the
current study, participants successfully modified symptom report and demonstrated
predictable changes in neuropsychological test performance in the face of non-monetary
incentives. The current results also support the notion that effort contributes significantly
to both self-report and objective measures of performance. The findings from the current
study support several conclusions. First, it must not be assumed that individuals all
approach an evaluation with their full effort. It must be recognized that some individuals
will purposefully fake bad. As such, the use of symptom validity measures is appropriate
across many evaluations, but especially those evaluations in which external incentive to
modify performance exist. Without the use of effort measures, individuals who fake bad
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may go undetected. Together, it seems pertinent to broaden our current conceptualization
of the external gains that could influence performance beyond monetary reimbursement
while also casting a wider net of symptom validity testing to accommodate this change.
More research is required to more comprehensively explore the relationship between
effort test failure, non-monetary incentives, and concussion, with the goal of increasing
the validity of our decisions based upon neuropsychological test data.
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Appendix A
Integrity of Intervention Form
How were you instructed to perform at the beginning of the session today?
 Like an athlete who wanted to return to sports participation
 Like a student getting ready to take the GRE
 I was not given any instructions on how to perform
Had I not been given any instructions on how to perform, my scores today were:
 Better than how I would typically perform
 Similar to how I would typically perform
 Worse than how I would typically perform
Do you feel you did a good job of acting as you were instructed?
 Yes
 No
If no, what happened?
 I did not understand the instructions
 I got confused or forgot my instructions
 I just wanted to earn my research credit
 Other_____________________________________________________________
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Appendix B
Demographic Information Form
Please complete the following information as yourself:
1)

Age:__________

2)

Sex:
Male
Female

3)

Class Status:
Freshman
Sophomore
Junior
Senior
Graduate

4)

Student Athlete Status
I am currently a student athlete at Syracuse University (varsity sports)
I currently participate in club sports at Syracuse University
I am not a current member of a club or varsity sport at Syracuse University

5)

Concussion History
I have no history of concussion
I have sustained one (1) concussion within the past 5 years
I have sustained two (2) concussions in the past 5 years
I have sustained 3 (3) or more concussions in the past 5 years

6)

Disability Status
I am a student without a disability
I am a student with a physical disability
I am a student with a learning disability
I am a student with an attention disability
I am a student with another disability (please indicate):
______________________________________________
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Appendix C
Scripts provided to participants in each experimental condition
Accommodations Condition (Fake Bad)
You are being asked to pretend that you are a college student who sustained a concussion
in a car accident. Concussion is a type of mild brain injury that can impact the way you
think and learn. The common symptoms of concussion include headaches, fatigue,
irritability, memory and concentration problems, and slowed thinking. Other symptoms
of concussion can include dizziness, nausea, and sensitivity to bright lights or loud
noises.
You are also being asked to pretend that you are currently a senior in college and
preparing to take the Graduate Record Exam (GRE). The test is next weekend. If you do
well on the GRE, your chances of getting into a good graduate program are greater. If
you do poorly on the GRE, you will likely have to wait to apply to graduate programs
until you are able to get more experience in your area of study.
College students who have a concussion can qualify for extended time on the GRE. To
ensure you receive extended time on the upcoming GRE, you will need to perform on the
following tasks in a way that suggests you are suffering from the symptoms of
concussion.
Please keep all of this information in mind as you complete the following measures.
Return to Play Condition (Fake Good)
You are being asked to pretend that you are a college student who sustained a concussion
in a car accident. Concussion is a type of mild brain injury that can impact the way you
think and learn. The common symptoms of concussion include headaches, fatigue,
irritability, memory and concentration problems, and slowed thinking. Other symptoms
of concussion can include dizziness, nausea, and sensitivity to bright lights or loud
noises.
You are also being asked to pretend that you are a senior in college and the starting point
guard on the basketball team. The big game is next weekend. If you do well in the game,
your chances of getting onto a good professional team are greater. If you do poorly in the
game, you will likely have to wait to try out for professional teams until you are able to
get more experience at your position.
College students who have a concussion can be removed from athletic competition to
avoid further injury. To ensure you can play in the upcoming game, you will need to
perform on the following tasks in a way that suggests that you are not suffering from the
symptoms of concussion.
Please keep all of this information in mind as you complete the following measures.

76

No Incentive Condition
You are being asked to pretend that you are a college student who sustained a concussion
in a car accident. Concussion is a type of mild brain injury that can impact the way you
think and learn. The common symptoms of concussion include headaches, fatigue,
irritability, memory and concentration problems, and slowed thinking. Other symptoms
of concussion can include dizziness, nausea, and sensitivity to bright lights or loud
noises.
Please keep all of this information in mind as you complete the following measures.
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Appendix D
Researcher Script


(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

Prior to participant’s arrival:
i) Turn on all 10 computers, load MSVT, MCI and ImPACT
ii) Place blank sheet of paper over each screen
iii) At each seat, place participation packet including:
Consent to Participate
Script
SDMT
MSVT Forms
Integrity of Intervention Form
Demographic Form
b) Place a pencil at each station

1) As participants arrive say: “Please choose a seat. We will begin the study shortly.”
Consent
 Once all participants have arrived, close the door and say: “You are here to
participate in a study designed to evaluate the effect of concussion on test
performance. Let’s begin by reading through the consent form. Please follow
along as I read aloud.” When finished reading ask: “Does anyone have any
questions?” Say: “If you agree to participate in the current study, please sign and
print your name and include the date.”
Once all participants have completed the consent, say:
 “Please turn to page 3 of your participant packet. Read the description quietly to
yourself and follow the instructions for the remainder of the study.”
“Does everyone understand what you are to do?”
“Please place your participant packet to the side with the front page facing you.”
ImPACT
 “In a moment, I will ask you to flip over the paper on your computer screen.
Please do not enter any information unless I tell you to do so. Please flip over
your paper now. On the first screen, please enter your date of birth. When
you have done so, please click “Next.””
 “On the following screen, please DO NOT enter your real name. For your
first name, please type the letter “J” followed by your ID number located at
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the top of your participant packet. For your last name, please type the letter
“D” followed by your ID number. Please identify your gender. Do not list
your height, weight, or handedness. Does anyone have any questions?”
 “ will now ask you click the “Next” button until you get to the screen that says
“Current Symptoms and Conditions – Page 1. If you need help, please raise
your hand.”
 “Please follow the directions as listed on top of the page. For this measure, a
1 means low or rarely and 6 means high or always. IT IS VERY
IMPORTANT THAT YOU REMEMBER TO RESPOND AS YOU
WERE INSTRUCTED AT THE BEGINNING OF THE EXPERIMENT.
There are 6 pages of symptoms and conditions. When you finish answers the
symptom questions, please sit quietly. If you have any questions, please raise
your hand. Do not begin the actual test until I tell you. Please complete the
symptom questions now.”
 Once all participants have finished, say: “You will be asked to complete
several short activities. You will be provided with instructions on how to
respond to each activity on the screen. When I say begin, please follow the
instructions on the screen. If you have any issues, please raise your hand.
When you finish, please raise your hand and a research assistant will help you.
IT IS VERY IMPORTANT THAT YOU REMEMBER TO RESPOND
AS YOU WERE INSTRUCTED AT THE BEGINNING OF THE
EXPERIMENT. Do you have any questions? Begin”

As students finish the ImPACT, minimize the browser, and open the MSVT
program.
MSVTi
 “Before we begin, the next measure, please turn to page 4 of your participant
packet and review the information. Remember to keep this information in
mind as we proceed through the experiment.”
 Say “Please place your participant packet to the side and flip the paper off
your computer screen. Before we begin this measure, please confirm the
highlighted ID number in the section for first and last name on the screen
matches the ID number listed on your participant packet.”
 Say: “This measure has two parts. IT IS VERY IMPORTANT THAT
YOU REMEMBER TO RESPOND AS YOU WERE INSTRUCTED AT
THE BEGINNING OF THE EXPERIMENT. When you finish the first
portion, please raise your hand and a research assistant will help you. To
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begin, click “Testing” then “Begin MSVT”. Select “English” and click “yes”.
Click on the screen to begin the task.”
As students finish the immediate subtests of the MSVT, minimize the screen, and
open the Memory Complaints Inventory. MSVTd must not be completed for 10
minutes.
MCI
 “Before we begin, the next measure, please turn to page 4 of your participant
packet and review the information. Keep this in mind as we proceed through
the experiment.”
 Say: “Before we begin, please confirm the ID number listed in the section for
first and last name matches the ID number listed on your participant packet.
Do not begin the measure until I say. IT IS VERY IMPORTANT THAT
YOU REMEMBER TO RESPOND AS YOU WERE INSTRUCTED AT
THE BEGINNING OF THE EXPERIMENT. When you finish the
measure, please sit quietly. If you have any problems, please raise your hand.
To begin this measure, please click “Testing” at the top of the screen and
select Administer MCI. Then select English, and click the screen to begin.
Remember to respond to the items as you were instructed at the beginning of
the study. Please raise your hand if you have any issues or when you finish
the measure.”
Once all students have been administered MCI, minimize the screen and re-open
MSVT. Flip the paper over the screen. Once all participants have completed the
MCI say
SDMT
 “Please turn to page 5 of your participant packet. This is a different task.
Look at the boxes. Each box has a unique symbol and a number underneath.
You are to fill in the numbers that correspond with each symbol. Start at the
top left and work across the rows. When you come to the end of one row,
move to the next. Work in order and do not skip any. When I say begin,
please complete the first 10 boxes up to the thick line to practice.”
 Once everyone has finished, say: “When I say Begin, I want you to do the rest
in the same way. Work in order and do not skip any. Work until I tell you to
stop. IT IS VERY IMPORTANT TO THAT YOU REMEMBER TO
RESPOND AS YOU WERE INSTRUCTED AT THE BEGINNING OF
THE EXPERIMENT Begin”
 After 120s say “Stop. Please put your participant packet to the side.”
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MSVTd
 Say “Please flip your paper over off the screen. On the top of the screen, find
the section marked “Testing” and click “Resume MSVT. Follow the
directions on the screen. Please perform in the manner instructed at the
beginning of the study. When the screen asks for the password, please flip
your paper over the screen.”
i) Once all participants have completed this MSVT, say “Please turn to page 6 of
your participant packet. I will say the first word in each pair. Please write
down the word that went with it.
 Say “Ice. Which word went with ICE? If you’re not sure, make your best
guess.” Allow time for all participants to respond.
 Say “Jet. Which word went with JET? If you’re not sure, make your best
guess.”
 Say “Picture. Which word went with PICTURE? If you’re not sure, make
your best guess.”
 Say “Skate. Which word went with SKATE? If you’re not sure, make
your best guess.”
 Say “Clock. Which word went with CLOCK? If you’re not sure, make
your best guess.”
 Say “Pizza. Which word went with PIZZA? If you’re not sure, make
your best guess.”
 Say “Skipping. Which word went with SKIPPING? If you’re not sure,
make your best guess.”
 Say “Soccer. Which word went with SOCCER? If you’re not sure, make
your best guess.”
 Say “Gas. Which word went with GAS? If you’re not sure, make your
best guess.”
 Say “Wood. Which word went with WOOD? If you’re not sure, make
your best guess.”
ii) Say “Please turn to page 7 of your participant packet. Now I want you to
write down all of the words you can remember from the original list. You can
write them in any order, in pairs, or one at a time”
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iii) When all participants have finished the MSVT say “Please turn to page 8 of
your participant packet. Please complete the next two pages independently.
Please respond to these items as yourself, NOT as you were instructed at the
beginning of the study. If you are confused, please raise your hand. When
you finish, please turn your packet over and sit quietly.”
iv) Once all participants have completed the rating forms say “You have now
completed participation in the current study. Thank you for your time today.
Please sign the PSY 205 log as you leave and take a copy of the consent form.
You will be awarded 1 hour of research participation for your help today.”
Post Data Collection
2) Once participants leave, collect participant packets, and save MSVT and MCI data at
each station and either prepare for the next subject or log off computers.
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Table 1
Commonly used neuropsychological measures in concussion management
Measure
Brief Visuospatial Memory TestRevised²
California Verbal Learning Test²
Continuous Performance Test²
Controlled Oral Word Association
Test¹²³
Cued Reaction Time²
Delayed Recall from HVLT³
Digit Span¹³
Figure Detection²
Grooved Pegboard¹³
Halstead-Reitan Neuropsychological
Test Battery²
Hopkins Verbal Learning Test¹²³
Memory for Designs Test²
Paced Auditory Serial Addition Test²
Reaction Times²
Rey Auditory Verbal Learning Test²
Rey-Osterreith Complex Figure Test²
Selective Reminding Test²
Speed and Capacity of Language
Processing Test²
Stroop Test³
Symbol Digit Modalities Test¹²³
Trailmaking Test¹²³
Verbal Fluency Test²
Wechsler Adult Intelligence ScaleRevised²
Wechsler Memory Scale-Revised²
Wisconsin Card Sorting Task²

1
2
3

Ability Evaluated
Visual memory
Verbal memory
Sustained attention, vigilance
Word fluency, word retrieval

Delayed verbal memory
Attention Span
Constructional Skills
Motor speed, coordination
Various
Verbal memory
Visual Memory
Complex attention, concentration
Visuospatial attention
Verbal memory, attention, concentration
Verbal memory
Language comprehension, visual scanning,
psychomotor speed
Mental flexibility, attention
Visual Scanning, attention
Visual scanning, mental flexibility
Language
Psychomotor speed, visual memory, attention,
concentration
Verbal memory, visual memory, story
learning, word learning
Executive functions, nonverbal problem
solving

Collins et al., 1999
Grindel, Lovell, & Collins, 2001
Maroon et al., 2000
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Table 2
Demographic characteristics of sample
Fake
Bad
(n=53)
n

%

Fake
Good
(n=62)
n

%

No
Incentive
(n=56)
n

%

Total
Sample
(n=171)
n

%

17
36

32.1
67.9

28
34

45.2
54.8

14
42

25.0
75.0

59
112

34.5
65.5

28
6
13
6

52.8
11.3
24.5
11.3

28
9
16
9

45.2
14.5
25.8
14.5

34
7
8
7

60.7
12.5
14.3
12.5

90
22
37
22

52.6
12.9
21.6
12.9

7
8
37
1

13.2
15.1
69.8
1.9

5
11
46
0

8.1
17.7
74.2
0

6
7
40
3

10.7
12.5
71.4
5.4

18
26
123
4

10.5
15.2
71.9
2.3

51
1
1

96.2
1.9
1.9

60
2
0

96.8
3.2
0

54
0
2

96.4
0
3.6

165
3
3

96.5
1.8
1.8

40
8
5
0

75.5
15.1
9.4
0

51
9
2
0

82.3
14.5
3.2
0

51
4
0
1

91.1
7.1
0
1.8

142
21
7
1

83.0
12.3
4.1
0.6

Sex
Male
Female
Year in School
Freshman
Sophomore
Junior
Senior
Athletic Status
Varsity Athlete
Club Athlete
Non-Athlete
No Response
Disability Status
Non-disabled
Other
No Response
Concussion History
No previous
1 concussion
2 concussions
3 concussions
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Table 3
Domains of measurement, measures used, and dependent variables

Domains and Measures

Dependent Variables

Manipulation Check
Memory Complaints Inventory
Integrity of Intervention Form

General Memory Problems score
Consistency
Relative Performance
Simulation Success

Effort Testing
Medical Symptom Validity Test

Pass/Fail

Symptom Report
Postconcussion Scale

Total Symptom Score
Symptom Impairment

Neuropsychological Test Performance
Immediate Post-Concussion Assessment and
Cognitive Testing

Symbol Digit Modalities Test

Verbal Memory
Visual Memory
Visual Motor Speed
Reaction Time
Number of correct items

85

Table 4
Kruskal-Wallis test using symptom score as the dependent variable
Group
Fake Bad

n
53

Mean
71.81

Median
72.00

Mean Rank
112.57

Fake Good

62

25.40

14.00

48.07

64.50

102.85

No Incentive
56
65.54
χ² = 58.21, df (2), p < .001, µ² = .34**
**Large effect size
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Table 5
Post-hoc comparison using symptom score as the dependent variable
Groups
Fake Bad – Fake Good

Mann-Whitney U
426.50

Z
-6.84

p
<.001

r
.51**

No Incentive – Fake Good
601.00
-6.13
<.001
.41*
________________________________________________________________________
_
*Medium effect
**Large effect
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Table 6
Crosstabulation and post-hoc comparison of symptom impairment by group
Symptom Report

Impaired

Group
Fake Bad
Fake Good
(n=53)
(n=62)
53
35

No Incentive χ²
(n=56)
52
43.03

Non-Impaired

0

4

Symptom Report

Impaired

Group
Fake Bad
Fake Good
(n=53)
(n=62)
53
35

Non-Impaired

0

Impaired

Group
No Incentive Fake Good
(n=56)
(n=62)
52
35

27

χ²
30.16

p

ɸc

< .001 .50**

p

ɸ

< .001 .51**

27
χ²
20.13

p
< .001

ɸ
.41*

Non-Impaired
4
27
________________________________________________________________________
*Medium effect
**Large effect
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Table 7
Kruskal-Wallis tests using ImPACT index scores and SDMT as dependent variables

Group
Fake Bad
Fake Good
No Incentive
χ² = 37.31, p < .001,µ² = .22**
Group
Fake Bad
Fake Good
No Incentive
χ² = 34.23, p < .001,µ² = .20**
Group
Fake Bad
Fake Good
No Incentive
χ² = 32.28, p < .001,µ² = .19**
Group
Fake Bad
Fake Good
No Incentive
χ² = 14.89, p = .001,µ² = .09*
Group
Fake Bad
Fake Good
No Incentive
χ² = 33.20, p < .001,µ² = .20**
*Medium effect
**Large effect

Verbal Memory
n
53
62
56

Mean
61.26
84.15
68.96

Median
62.00
88.00
72.00

Mean
Rank
60.58
115.38
77.32

Visual Memory
n
53
62
56

Mean
53.11
72.89
56.91

Median
52.00
74.00
55.50

Mean
Rank
65.08
115.01
73.69

Visual Motor
nSpeed
53
62
56

Mean
27.21
39.05
31.28

Median
27.28
37.83
33.88

Mean
Rank
61.92
113.08
78.81

Reaction Time
n
53
62
56

Mean
.91
.64
.83

Median
.74
.63
.69

Mean
Rank
100.21
66.95
93.64

SDMT
n
53
62
56

Mean
50.36
70.87
56.59

Median
51.00
71.50
57.50

Mean
Rank
61.83
113.56
78.36
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Table 8
Post-hoc comparison of group and ImPACT index and SDMT scores

Verbal Memory
Contrast
Fake Bad – Fake Good
No Incentive – Fake
Good

Mann-Whitney U
634.50
923.00

Z
-5.66

p
<.001

r
.53**

-4.38

<.001

.40*

Z
-5.24

p
<.001

r
.48*

-4.66

<.001

.43*

Z
-5.43

p
<.001

r
.51**

-3.83

<.001

.35*

Z
-3.48

p
.001

r
.32*

-3.03

.002

.28*

Z
-5.73
-3.71

p
<.001
<.001

r
.52**
.34*

Visual Memory
Contrast
Fake Bad – Fake Good
No Incentive – Fake
Good

Mann-Whitney U
709.50
871.00

Visual Motor Speed
Contrast
Fake Bad – Fake Good
No Incentive – Fake
Good

Mann-Whitney U
674.50
1025.50

Reaction Time
Contrast
Fake Bad – Fake Good
No Incentive – Fake
Good

Mann-Whitney U
1023.50
1174.50

SDMT
Contrast
Fake Bad – Fake Good
No Incentive – Fake
Good

Mann-Whitney U
622.00
1048.00

*Medium effect
**Large effect
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Table 9
Group means, and standard deviations for MSVT
Fake Bad
(n=53)
73.96 (27.20)

Fake Good
(n=62)
98.47 (5.77)

No Incentive
(n=56)
80.63 (26.18)

70.00 (27.54)

98.23 (3.15)

78.48 (27.20)

MSVT Consistency

73.21 (21.17)

96.85 (6.85)

83.66 (18.89)

MSVT Paired Recall

67.36 (26.97)

96.29 (10.28)

75.00 (27.44)

MSVT Free Recall

47.36 (20.65)

70.10 (21.16)

52.77 (25.95)

MSVT Immediate
Recall
MSVT Delayed Recall
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Table 10
Crosstabulation and post-hoc comparisons of group and effort test failure
Effort Test

Passed

Group
Fake Bad
(n=53)
19

Fake Good
(n=62)
60

No Incentive χ²
p
(n=56)
31
49.14 < .001

Failed

34

2

25

Effort Test

Passed

Group
Fake Bad
Fake Good
(n=53)
(n=62)
19
60

Failed

34

Passed

Group
No Incentive Fake Good
(n=56)
(n=62)
31
60

χ²

p

ɸc
.54**

ɸ

49.32 < .001

.66**

χ²

ɸ

2

p

28.60 < .001 . 49*

Failed
25
2
__________________________________________________________________
*Medium effect
**Large effect
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Table 11
Comparison of current results to similar studies
Current Study
Fake Bad
(n = 53)

Fake
Good
(n = 62)

No Incentive
(n = 56)

Measure

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

Symptom Score

71.81

24.32

25.40

31.05

65.54

28.16

Verbal Memory

61.26

21.17

84.15

14.33

68.96

20.07

Visual Memory

53.11

19.73

72.89

13.38

56.91

17.92

Visual Motor

27.21

11.36

39.05

6.88

31.28

10.95

Reaction Time

.91

.44

.64

.10

.83

.37

SDMT Raw

50.36

21.06

70.87

14.65

56.59

19.97

Similar Studies
Broglio et al., 2007

Iverson et al., 2005

Schatz et al., 2006

MTBI Athletes
(n = 21)

MTBI Athletes
(n = 72)

MTBI Athletes
(n = 72)

Measure

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

Symptom Score

25.86

20.45

17.40

16.30

26.50

22.10

Verbal Memory

78.00

19.00

81.20

12.40

79.10

12.30

Visual Memory

64.00

14.00

72.30

14.90

65.90

14.80

Visual Motor

36.06

10.40

35.60

8.30

32.70

7.50

Reaction Time

.66

.18

.58

.12

.66

.15

58.00

10.00

SDMT Raw
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